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OVERSTATING AMERICA’S WRONGFUL
CONVICTION RATE?
REASSESSING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
ABOUT THE PREVALENCE OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS
Paul G. Cassell*

A growing body of academic literature discusses the problem of wrongful
convictions—i.e., convictions of factually innocent defendants for crimes they did
not commit. But how often do such miscarriages of justice actually occur? Justice
Scalia cited a figure of 0.027% as a possible error rate. But the conventional view
in the literature is that, for violent crimes, the error rate is much higher—at least
1%, and perhaps as high as 4% or even more.
This Article disputes that conventional wisdom. Based on a careful review of the
available empirical literature, it is possible to assemble the component parts of a
wrongful conviction rate calculation by looking at error rates at trial, the ratio of
wrongful convictions obtained through trials versus plea bargains, and the
percentage of cases resolved through pleas. Combining empirically based estimates
for each of these three factors, a reasonable (and possibly overstated) calculation
of the wrongful conviction rate appears, tentatively, to be somewhere in the range
of 0.016%–0.062%—a range that comfortably embraces Justice Scalia’s oftencriticized figure.
If this Article’s tentative error-rate range is correct, it means that previous
scholarship has significantly overstated the risk of wrongful conviction. Moreover,
it is possible to compare the lifetime risk of being wrongfully convicted to the risk of
being a victim of a violent crime. The relative risk ratio appears to be about 30,000
to 1. This decidedly skewed ratio suggests that reform measures for protecting the
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innocent may need to be cautiously assessed to ensure that they do not interfere with
the important goal of prosecuting the guilty.
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INTRODUCTION
How often are innocent people wrongfully convicted in America’s criminal
justice system? This question has been aptly described as not only the most basic
question about wrongful convictions but also the most important.1 For many reasons,
we would like to have some quantitative assessment of this figure. For example, in
considering a challenge to a state death penalty system, competing Supreme Court
Justices debated the risk that an innocent person might be executed.2 In the course
of that debate, Justice Scalia cited an error-rate estimate of 0.027% made by Clatsop
County, Oregon District Attorney Josh Marquis.3 Justice Scalia went on to argue:
Like other human institutions, courts and juries are not perfect.
One cannot have a system of criminal punishment without
accepting the possibility that someone will be punished
mistakenly. That is a truism, not a revelation. But with regard to
1.

Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 176

(2008).
2.
Compare Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring),
with id. at 209 (Souter, J., concurring).
3.
Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the
Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23).
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the punishment of death in the current American system, that
possibility has been reduced to an insignificant minimum.4
Professor Sam Gross (among others) has strongly critiqued Justice Scalia’s
tentative 0.027% calculation.5 But interestingly, while criticizing the figure, Gross
also acknowledged that some sort of quantitative understanding of the error rate is
important and, indeed, inherent in a burgeoning body of legal scholarship on
wrongful convictions. Academics and others interested in the subject must have at
least some implicit—and significant—error rate in mind, because otherwise they
would be devoting their attention to a subject that does not really matter.6 After all,
as Gross has concluded, “[i]f false convictions really were vanishingly rare—
0.027% or some other absurd figure—they would not be much of a problem.”7
This Article is an effort to think seriously about the magnitude of the risk
of wrongful conviction. To be sure, it will never be possible to precisely identify
exactly how many people are wrongfully convicted each year. No government
agency maintains an official ledger of every innocent person who was mistakenly
convicted.8 But as the debate about specific error rates before the Supreme Court
makes clear, the scale of the problem can have important public policy implications.
It is, accordingly, quite useful to at least try to narrow the range of estimates.9
Interestingly, much of the recent innocence scholarship has simply
despaired of any effort to quantify a wrongful conviction rate, calling that figure
“unknown and frustratingly unknowable.”10 But, while staking out a position of
unknowability, many of the same scholars have been willing to venture specific
estimates of a false conviction rate—indeed, estimates well above 1%. Professor
Dan Simon’s influential book, for example, summarizes the often-articulated
conventional position that “[b]ased on exoneration data in two categories of capital
homicide, the rate of error is estimated at about 3–4 percent, with a possible upper
boundary of 5 percent. The rate of false convictions is most likely considerably
higher.”11
This Article challenges the seemingly developing conventional wisdom
that the error rate in America’s criminal justice system is 1% or even higher. In fact,
looking at the best available and current data, a conservative estimate of the error
rate is somewhere close to the 0.027% posited by Justice Scalia. While one can
debate whether such a small error rate makes wrongful convictions “vanishingly
rare,” this number is clearly considerably lower than the figure commonly cited by
4.
Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., concurring).
5.
Samuel R. Gross, Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat in the Marsh, 105
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 69–70 (2006); see also DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 226 n.12 (2012).
6.
See Gross, supra note 1, at 175–76; see also Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively
Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221, 230–31 (2012).
7.
Gross, supra note 1, at 176.
8.
An important private (but incomplete) effort in this direction is the National
Registry of Exonerations, discussed at infra note 77 and accompanying text.
9.
See Zalman, supra note 6, at 230–33.
10.
SIMON, supra note 5, at 4 (quoting Gross, supra note 5, at 69).
11.
Id.
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innocence scholars and others who suggest a pressing need to adopt broad criminal
justice reforms to reduce error rates even further.
This Article proceeds in several steps. It begins in Part I by defining the
term “wrongful conviction rate,” following the common approach in the innocence
literature of looking at “wrong person” cases—i.e., factually innocent persons who
have been convicted of crimes that they did not commit. The focus here will be
wrongful convictions for crimes of violence, because those are, generally speaking,
the most serious crimes.
Part II then turns to calculating an empirically based wrongful conviction
rate. It is possible to simply qualitatively estimate a wrongful conviction rate. But
without empirical grounding, such an estimate is of little real use. One empirically
based approach can be described as a “component-parts approach.” This approach
breaks down the error rate into constituent pieces, starting with evidence of error
rates at trial and other relevant figures. These figures can then be combined to
produce an estimated general error rate for all convictions obtained through both
trials and guilty pleas. Based on the available empirical evidence, the current general
error rate for violent crime cases can be estimated at around 0.031%, roughly the
same as the figure suggested by Justice Scalia—and far below the figure commonly
relied upon in innocence scholarship. Using this figure as a midpoint of a range of
estimates produces an estimated wrongful conviction range of between 0.016% and
0.062%.
Part III looks at the possible moral culpability of some of the wrongfully
convicted for their plights. A significant risk factor for becoming a wrongfully
convicted person is prior criminal history. This fact has been often overlooked in
discussing wrongful convictions.
Part IV takes the wrongful conviction rate numbers derived through these
various approaches and tries to place them into context. One way of doing this is to
compare the lifetime risk of being wrongfully convicted for a violent crime with the
lifetime risk of becoming a violent crime victim. This comparison suggests that a
person is about 30,000 times more likely to fall victim to criminal violence than to
become a wrongfully convicted prisoner. Part IV also explores the possible moral
culpability of some of the wrongfully convicted for their plight, suggesting that this
culpability may also need to be considered in assessing the scope of the wrongful
conviction problem.
This Article concludes with some thoughts about what these numbers tell
us about how America’s criminal justice system is operating and how it might be
improved in light of the data on wrongful convictions.

I.

DEFINING THE “WRONGFUL CONVICTION” RATE AND ITS
IMPORTANCE

Before attempting to quantify something, it is important to understand
exactly what that something is. This Article attempts to provide a reasonable
estimate of the “wrongful conviction” rate in the American criminal justice system.
While the term “wrongful conviction” is found throughout a growing body of
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academic literature,12 at first blush, the term can seem imprecise. A conviction, after
all, could be “wrongful” in a variety of ways. For example, a convicted defendant
might have been initially selected for prosecution for inappropriate reasons. Or a
convicted defendant may have introduced evidence at trial proving that, in the eyes
of the law, he should not have been found guilty—perhaps for reasons of selfdefense, insanity, or other grounds for acquittal. Or it is even possible to define a
“wrongful conviction” so broadly as to include simply cases in which a defendant
can create reasonable doubt as to his guilt.13
Following the well-worn path of previous scholarship, this Article will
focus more precisely not on “legal innocence”14 but rather on “factual innocence”
or “actual innocence”—i.e., “wrong man”15 or “wrong person” cases where
someone is convicted for a crime he16 did not commit17 or for a crime that never
actually happened.18 To be sure, situations where a defendant presents a legal claim
(e.g., self-defense) that the jury mistakenly rejects are tragedies in their own right—

12.
See, e.g., WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 138 (Daniel Medwed ed., 2017); WRONGFUL CONVICTION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds.,
2014); Zalman, supra note 6, at 241 (estimating a “wrongful conviction” rate). The term “false
conviction” is also sometimes used interchangeably. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, What We
Think, What We Know and What We Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 753 (2017); Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates
Incentives for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126 (2013).
13.
See Tony G. Poveda, Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. Q. 689, 695–
97 (2001).
14.
See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1560; cf.
Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 436–62 (2018)
(arguing that “legal innocence” cases are more akin to factual innocence cases than is
generally recognized).
15.
See, e.g., James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010) (discussing “wrong man” convictions exposed
by DNA).
16.
Most of the wrongfully convicted are men. See Gross, supra note 12, at 756
(noting 91% of the 1,900 individuals exonerated from January 1989 through October 2016
were men).
17.
For similar approaches using factual innocence see, for example, Paul G.
Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful
Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 535 (1999); Zalman,
supra note 6, at 246 (exploring “wrongful conviction” defined to mean “factual innocence
and not . . . procedurally defective convictions”); see also Michael Radelet, How DNA Has
Changed Contemporary Death Penalty Debates (discussing conceptual issues surrounding
innocence), in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 138;
Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 508–09 (2005);
Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2011); cf. Charles D.
Weisselberg, Against Innocence, in THE INTEGRITY OF CRIMINAL PROCESS: FROM THEORY
INTO PRACTICE 349 (Jill Hunter et al. eds., 2016) (contesting factual innocence standard).
18.
See generally Jessica S. Henry, Smoke but No Fire: When Innocent People Are
Wrongly Convicted of Crimes that Never Happened, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 665 (2018).
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and “wrongful convictions” in some general, moral sense.19 But these kinds of
wrongful convictions present different kinds of issues than this Article discusses.
Of course, determining exactly when such a wrong person miscarriage of
justice has occurred can be the subject of debate. It is very easy for criminal justice
critics to allege that an “innocent” person has been convicted even when the facts
strongly suggest otherwise.20 But as DNA and other exonerations vividly document,
clearly at least some cases of wrong person convictions have occurred. The focus of
this Article is how often such wrongful convictions occur.
Before turning to quantification issues, it is important to recognize that a
grave and serious injustice occurs whenever the criminal justice system wrongfully
convicts people for crimes they did not commit. The harms extending from such
convictions can be manifold and long-lasting.21 The most obvious harm is (for
serious crimes, at least) a term of imprisonment—a term that can be substantial.
Related to this consequence are financial, reputational, and other injuries that follow
a wrongful conviction.22 And crime victims should not be forgotten. In cases of
wrongful conviction, they will be traumatized when they learn “that the criminal
who had attacked them had not been caught and punished after all, and that they
themselves may have played a role in destroying the life of an innocent person.”23
Considering the serious repercussions of wrongful convictions, recent
wrongful conviction scholarship has often focused on identifying the underlying
causes of such miscarriages.24 The laudable goal of these efforts is to learn why the
criminal justice system malfunctions, with an eye to correcting an individual cause
(or, as is often the case, the compounding causes25) of wrongful convictions.
This Article maintains a slightly different focus. It tries to come to grips
with the magnitude of the wrongful conviction problem. As with other serious social
problems, the scope of the issue can have substantial implications, such as

19.
See generally Findley, supra note 17, at 1163.
20.
See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A
Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988) (responding to dubious
claims that 23 “innocent” people have been wrongfully executed); Cassell, supra note 17
(responding to dubious claims that 29 “innocent” people were wrongfully convicted due to
false confessions).
21.
See Gross, supra note 12, at 756 (“[W]ith few exceptions every story [of false
conviction] is a heartbreaking tragedy.”).
22.
See Robert J. Norris, Exoneree Compensation: Current Policies and Future
Outlook, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 12, at 289.
23.
Gross, supra note 12, at 755; see also Sion Jenkins, Families at War?
Relationships Between “Survivors” of Wrongful Conviction and “Survivors” of Serious
Crime, 20 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 243 (2014).
24.
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux (collecting
causes of wrongful convictions), in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION,
supra note 12 at 40, 43–53.
25.
Julia Carrano & Marvin Zalman, An Introduction to Innocence Reform
(“[M]ost often wrongful convictions are attributable to several errors or instances of
misconduct operating in concert.”), in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 11, 15 (2014).
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determining the priority of resources to address the issue or the need for structural
or other reforms. As Professors Carrano and Zalman have wisely explained:
The number of false convictions occurring each year is important;
if minuscule when compared to total criminal convictions, it will
be a minor justice problem in comparison to other concerns that
should take precedence. If, however, miscarriages of justice are
occurring at epidemic rather than episodic rates, wrongful
conviction emerges as a major policy concern.26
Not all innocence scholars agree that the size of the problem matters.
Professors Richard Leo and Jon Gould, for example, have argued that “it is not
necessary to know the incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon to study it
empirically or scientifically. Virtually every aspect of the study of American crime
and criminal justice contains some incomplete or missing information.”27 But while
it is true that we can certainly study the wrongful conviction problem without
knowing its prevalence, the problem’s size presents tremendous public policy
implications. For example, one of the country’s leading innocence scholars,
Professor Samuel Gross, concluded that if false convictions “really were vanishingly
rare—0.027% or some other absurd figure”—then we should conclude that they are
not “much of a problem.”28 Presumably, it is because innocence scholars believe
that wrongful convictions are a serious problem that they devote their time to
studying the issue.
Indeed, while Professors Leo and Gould initially argued that the frequency
of the wrongful convictions was “unknown and unknowable,”29 in a later article they
acknowledge that existing research has “greatly narrowed the range.”30 But the
range that they identify runs from somewhere just above nonexistent to around 3%
to 5% of all convictions.31 As a practical matter, that is almost no range at all because
most observers asked to estimate the size of the wrongful conviction problem would
put it somewhere between 0.0001% and around 5%.32
What Leo and Gould—and apparently many other innocence scholars—
appear to implicitly assume is that the frequency of wrongful convictions tends
toward the higher end of this range of possibilities—i.e., 1% or even more of all
convictions. For example, summarizing the state of the innocence literature in 2017,
Professor Gross concluded that the wrongful conviction rate for violent felonies “is
somewhere in the range from one to several percent.”33 Dan Simon recounts a
working figure of “about 3–4 percent, with a possible upper boundary of 5
26.
Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
27.
Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning
from Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 29 (2009).
28.
Gross, supra note 1, at 176.
29.
Leo & Gould, supra note 27, at 29.
30.
Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 832 (2010).
31.
Id.
32.
See Marvin Zalman et al., Officials’ Estimates of the Incidence of ‘Actual
Innocence’ Convictions, 25 JUST. Q. 72 (2008).
33.
Gross, supra note 12, at 785.
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percent”—maybe something even higher.34 Figures in this range appear to be the
emerging conventional wisdom about the magnitude of the wrongful conviction
problem.35
If the number of wrongful convictions was that high, the problem would
truly be at epidemic levels. A 3% or 4% wrongful conviction rate would mean more
than 10,000 innocent people are sent to prison every year.36 This would be a public
policy problem of truly staggering proportions.
So let’s turn to the numbers—how often are factually innocent people
wrongfully convicted in America’s modern criminal justice system?

II.

CALCULATING THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION RATE BY
COMBINING EMPIRICALLY ESTIMATED COMPONENTS

This Part takes up the challenge of trying to determine the “unknown and
frustratingly unknowable” figure of the frequency of wrongful convictions.37 This
Part begins by explaining why empirically based estimates should be preferred over
qualitative assessments of the error rate. It then turns to one possible way of deriving
a wrongful conviction rate: disaggregating the rate into component parts and then
trying to assemble empirically based estimates for each of these parts. Based on the
best estimates currently available, this Part concludes that for serious violent crimes,
the error rate can be conservatively estimated to about .00031 or 0.031% or 3.1 out
of 10,000 convictions—a figure considerably lower than other innocence scholars
have suggested.
A. The Need for an Empirically Based Estimate
In attempting to quantify the size of the wrongful conviction problem, a
researcher immediately runs into multiple difficulties. We know that wrongful
34.
35.

SIMON, supra note 5, at 4.
See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 264 (2011) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s 0.027% error
rate and suggesting that the true rate is likely more than 100 times higher, i.e., more than
2.7%); LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIALS AND ERRORS? 54 (2016)
(reviewing exoneration studies and concluding that 3.25% is the mean estimate of a wrongful
conviction rate); Findley, supra note 17, at 1169 (criticizing Justice Scalia’s 0.027% error
rate and arguing “[m]ore serious analyses of the scope of the problem of wrongful convictions
paint a very different picture”); Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal
Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 133, 142 n.71 (2008) (noting the 3.3% to 5.0% rate for capital rape murder
calculated by Michael Risinger and calling it the “most empirically sound” effort to develop
a wrongful conviction rate); Roger Koppl, Comment on Laudan, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
1255, 1256 (2018) (arguing 3% wrongful conviction figure may be “too low”); see also
Carrano & Zalman, supra note 25, at 14 (citing a 7.8% error rate in sexual assault cases and
concluding it provides strong evidence “that wrongful convictions are widespread and
numerous—more epidemic than episodic”); Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public
Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 305, 330 (2016) (reviewing cases of exoneration and reaching the “inescapable
conclusion” that “wrongful convictions are not isolated instances but a national epidemic”).
36.
See Zalman, supra note 6, at 225.
37.
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 5, at 4.
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convictions occur, but no authoritative tabulation exists. Of course, if we knew that
a person charged with a crime was innocent, we would not convict that person to
begin with. It is only later—often years later—when a person is exonerated through
DNA or other means that a wrongful conviction is revealed. But looking at these
discovered exonerations can be problematic because they can be “uncommon,
unpredictable, and unrepresentative of wrongful convictions in general.”38
One way to approach estimating the size of the error rate would be to ask
knowledgeable people what they believe that error rate is. A recent summary of such
approaches is contained in Professor Zalman’s informative 2012 article, in which he
attempted to collect all such estimates and then made his own estimate.39 After
surveying the existing empirical literature on such estimated error rates, Zalman
defended the proposition that a reasonable estimate of the wrongful conviction rate
is 0.5%–1.0% for all felony offenses. He further argued that there was “clear and
convincing” evidence and reason against any higher error rate.40
Zalman characterized his approach as a “qualitative” estimate.”41 But while
his approach is intriguing, it ultimately rests on little more than his own subjective
sense of what the right figure is in this area. The approach has drawn fire from
numerous observers, as Zalman himself acknowledges.42 For example, Judge
Hoffman called it “a deeply flawed method,”43 Professors Gross and O’Brien
viewed it as “just collective guess work,”44 and Professors Gould and Leo concluded
it lacked any connection to the “underlying error rate in the real world of criminal
justice.”45
These criticisms have merit. It is one thing to ask experienced observers
for an estimate when they have, in fact, observed something. It is quite another to
ask them for estimates of something that they know may be occurring but do not
have any real way of detecting. Perhaps such estimates can be used to provide a
general order-of-magnitude calculation as to the size of problem.46 But while
Zalman has labored long and hard to collect information about such estimates—and
while he is a leading scholar in this area—at the end of the day, his subjective views
on what is the right figure carry little weight to someone who takes a different point
of view. For example, to my mind, even a 0.5% overall error rate would be very

38.
Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False
Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 927, 929 (2008).
39.
Zalman, supra note 6, at 233–67.
40.
Id. at 278.
41.
Id. at 222.
42.
Id. at 229.
43.
Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
663, 668 n.23 (2007).
44.
Gross & O’Brien, supra note 38, at 930.
45.
Gould & Leo, supra note 30, at 933–34 n.44.
46.
Cf. Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions – and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 514 (1998) (relying on
estimated error rates to create an upper boundary for the “false confession” problem, but
cautioning that such an approach is not “empirically well founded”).
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much an upper bound of possible wrongful conviction rates,47 while others would
find his 1% ceiling too low. But the decisive point remains that, without some realworld grounding, it is hard to determine whether any estimated number is too high,
too low, or about right. To do better, some grounding in real-world data is needed.
B. The Component Parts of a Wrongful Conviction Rate
Various scholars have previously tried to assess the scope of the wrongful
conviction problem. Indeed, nearly 20 years ago, I made a brief foray into the
subject.48 The difficulty, of course, is that wrongful convictions are not easy to
count. Despite the difficulty, however, we need not despair of any effort to attempt
to assess the scope of the wrongful conviction problem. What may be required is
simply to break the problem into various pieces of more manageable size.
One of the most helpful recent discussions along these lines came from
Professors Ron Allen and Larry Laudan, who made a serious attempt to provide a
methodology for quantifying a system-wide rate of wrongful convictions.49 Allen
and Laudan separate the overall wrongful conviction rate into three component
parts: the wrongful conviction rate at trial; the proportion of cases resolved by trial
versus plea; and the ratio of wrongful convictions resulting from trial versus plea.50
When these three parts are multiplied together, the result is an estimated wrongful
conviction rate for guilty-plea cases:
trial error rate
x
ratio of wrongful convictions in guilty pleas versus trial
x
overall ratio of trials to pleas
=
wrongful conviction rate in guilty-plea cases

47.
Zalman appears to base his estimate, at least in part, on trial error rates. See
Zalman, supra note 6, at 241–47. But the well-known fact is that the vast majority of criminal
cases in America are resolved by guilty pleas. And it seems to be generally agreed in the
innocence scholarship that defendants who are factually innocent are less likely to plead guilty
than are those who are legally innocent. See infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text.
Zalman apparently agrees that an adjustment needs to be made for the fact that error rates in
guilty pleas are likely to be much lower, see Zalman, supra note 6, at 260–61, but he does not
specifically explain how this fact is taken into account by his overall qualitative calculation.
48.
Cassell, supra note 46, at 508–14 (discussing wrongful conviction figures in
the context of false confessions).
49.
See Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV.
65 (2008). For further developments of the argument, see, for example, Larry Laudan &
Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010);
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011); LAUDAN, supra note 35; Larry
Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Pattern in Criminal
Prosecutions by “Empiricizing” the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False Acquittals and
Serial Offenders Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018).
50.
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 71.

2018]

WRONGFUL CONVICTION

825

And with a conviction rate available for guilty-plea cases, a straightforward
weighted average for all cases (both guilty-plea cases and trial cases) produces an
overall wrongful conviction rate.51
The reason for this disaggregation is that some empirically based estimates
are available for each of the three component parts. Perhaps the most important (and
controversial) piece is the initial component—the wrongful conviction rate at trial.
In making their calculations, Professors Allen and Laudan simply assumed a 5%
wrongful trial conviction, drawing upon Professor Risinger’s important article on
the subject.52 As discussed in the following Section, Professor Risinger collected a
sample of cases—specifically, capital cases in which DNA exonerations had
occurred; working backward from those exonerations, Risinger came up with a 3.3%
trial error rate and suggested that a likely maximum rate would be 5%.53 A similar
estimate has been made by Professor Samuel Gross, who estimated that the risk of
wrongful conviction for all violent felonies (presumably at trial) is in the range of
“one to several percent.”54
Allen and Laudan then argue, quite plausibly, that the percentage of
wrongful convictions will be lower in cases where a defendant has decided to plead
guilty rather than go to trial.55 Presumably, most people pleading guilty are, in fact,
guilty.56 However, wrongful conviction research has established that, in some
unusual cases, innocent people enter guilty pleas.57 To derive a specific figure for
the wrongful conviction rate in cases involving plea bargains, Allen and Laudan rely
on Professor Brandon Garrett’s study of a collection of wrongful conviction cases
in which only 4.5% were guilty pleas.58 Allen and Laudan then apply this figure to
derive a weighted average of wrongful convictions for all cases, both those resolved
through trial and those resolved through plea.59 Given that many more cases are
resolved through plea bargaining than through trial, Allen and Laudan ultimately
calculate an estimated error rate in the American criminal justice system of 0.84%,
or 8.4 out of 1000 convictions.60
51.
While the Allen and Laudan approach was published a decade ago, to my
knowledge no one has challenged the formula that they provide for deriving a number.
52.
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 71 (citing D. Michael
Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate,
97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 761 (2007)).
53.
D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780 (2007)
54.
Gross, supra note 12, at, 785; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in
the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 532 (2005).
55.
Allen & Lauden, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 70–71.
56.
Cf. Hoffman, supra note 43, at 672–73 (concluding that wrongful conviction
via guilty plea is likely rare, but acknowledging pressures that modern plea bargaining
practices place on defendants).
57.
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74 (2008).
58.
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 71 (discussing Garrett,
supra note 57, at 74).
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 71 (.05 trial error rate x 9/191 ratio of wrongful convictions through plea
compared to through trial x 16/84 ratio of the number of trials convictions to the number of
guilty pleas = .00045).
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Professor Risinger wrote a lengthy and interesting critique of the Allen and
Laudan calculation.61 While Risinger makes many interesting points, the focus here
will be on his argument that the Allen and Laudan error rate is understated.62 In fact,
a careful assessment of the best-available data suggests that Allen and Laudan have
overstated the rate. The following Sections use the component-parts methodology
to calculate a risk of wrongful conviction for all violent crimes (conventionally
defined by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies as murder, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault).
C. Error Rates at Trial
Consider first the wrongful conviction rate at trial. As the starting point for
an error-rate calculation, this figure is perhaps the most important component part.
And given that this figure measures the “black hole” of system malfunctions, it is
difficult to determine. However, plausible approaches exist for tentatively
developing an estimate.
1.

The Risinger Error-Rate Figure

The 3.3% Risinger error-rate figure is useful to examine because it is one
of the most widely cited in the wrongful conviction literature.63 Derived from a
sample of capital rape-murder trials in the 1980s, it is one of the higher figures
available in the empirical literature.64 The Risinger figure is also useful to examine
61.
See D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A
Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991 (2010).
62.
Id. at 995–97, 1016.
63.
See, e.g., Zalman, supra note 6, at 241 (identifying the Risinger figure as “the
most robust death sentence wrongful conviction rate estimate”); see also Glossip v. Gross,
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2758 (2015) (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ, dissenting) (citing the 3.3% error-rate
figure).
64.
It is not the highest error-rate estimate. That distinction appears to belong to
a study done by the Urban Institute, which recently calculated an error rate of 11.6% in certain
rape cases, up from an error rate of 7.8% that it had calculated in an earlier iteration of the
same study. See KELLY WALSH ET AL., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTION 1 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251115.pdf; see also JOHN
ROMAN ET AL., POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTION 7 (2012),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25506/412589-Post-Conviction-DNATesting-and-Wrongful-Conviction.PDF.
The study used a retrospective analysis of retained physical-evidence files
maintained by the Virginia Department of Forensic Science (DFS) from sexual assault and
homicide cases dating from 1973 to 1987. ROMAN ET AL., supra, at 4. It is worth considering
how the data for the study was captured. The authors learned that a forensic serologist in
Virginia, Jane Burton, had retained clippings of physical evidence in hundreds of her files—
apparently to use while testifying before the jury. Id. This physical evidence was retained
after testing, while the underlying crime scene evidence was then returned to the originating
jurisdiction. Id. Several decades later, the study’s authors examined Burton’s files to collect
their data. Id.
This approach introduces four possible sources of bias. First, it seems likely
that physical evidence was sent to Burton only when some sort of contested serological
determination was required. Second, a question arises as to whether Burton would have made
a clipping in all cases—or just one in which a dispute, and thus jury testimony, could be
anticipated. Third, a question also arises as to whether she retained all of her files or just some
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because, unlike some other studies, there can be little doubt about the innocence of
the people included in the study.65 The exonerations are all based on publicly

of her files. For example, it is possible that she may not have retained files in cases where a
defendant had readily admitted guilt or an originating jurisdiction advised that no jury trial
was likely. Fourth, and related to this point, the study notes that the “vast majority” of physical
evidence was tested by Burton, id. at 14 n.18, but some (unidentified) proportion was tested
by “serologists she had trained.” Id. at 12 n.17. These samples are clearly subject to the
problem of selection bias, because it seems clear that they were not a random sample of the
cases analyzed by the trained serologists, but presumably were a small fraction of the cases
they had handled. It seems reasonable to think that the files retained decades later would have
been the most disputed or contentious cases, as the serologists might have been wondering
about appeals and possible retrials.
In the latest version of the study, the authors have simply added in an
additional five cases of exonerations, explaining (somewhat cryptically) that this was done
“to ensure inclusion of exonerations that were a part of the set of convictions this study
focuses on but did not have an available DFS file in [the initial study].” WALSH ET AL., supra,
at 6 n.2. But because the convictions that the study focuses on, at least as originally described,
were convictions involving a DFS file maintained by Burton, it is hard to understand the
justification for simply adding in these additional exonerations. Given the small number of
cases (29) from which the conclusions of the study are generated, see WALSH ET AL., supra,
at 10, all these questions raise concerns about the generalizability of the study’s findings.
One other unfortunate limitation of the study is that it describes almost all of
the “exoneration” cases pseudonymously. The study included two cases of acknowledged
wrongful conviction, but as to the others it is impossible to evaluate the author’s
characterization of likely “exoneration”—or to see whether the governor (who had requested
the reanalysis, Roman, supra, at 12) ultimately agreed with the characterization. This has to
be regarded as a serious problem with the study, given the debate that swirls around what
counts as sufficient proof of innocence to constitute an exoneration and concern that some
studies have used inappropriately lax standards for making that determination. See supra note
20. In an effort to evaluate the reliability of the exoneration determinations, I requested
identifiers from the study’s authors. Unfortunately, they were precluded from releasing the
names by their own internal policies and their data agreement with the National Institute of
Justice. Email from Kelly Walsh to author (Jan. 10, 2018) (on file with author).
The facts just discussed suggest that the Urban Institute’s number may
overstate a wrongful conviction rate. It is worth noting, however, that as a measure of trial
errors, the study may understate the rate of wrongful convictions, because it apparently
included both trial cases and guilty-plea cases. Roman, supra, at 2.
65.
While endorsing the reliability of the Risinger figure, Koppl and Sacks have
estimated a wrongful conviction figure that rests on nothing more than situations where juries
reached differing outcomes on the same facts in 12.5% of criminal case studies. See Koppl &
Sacks, supra note 12, at 131. They note that in all the cases of disagreement, the defendant
could have been guilty but conclude that “the opposite possibility seems no less possible.” Id.
But before a case can go to trial, a finding of “probable cause” must be made by the courts,
see City of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S 44 (1991), and a prosecutor must have
determined that the admissible evidence provides a reasonable likelihood of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, see CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS OF THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION
§
3–4.3
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourth
Edition/. Accordingly, whenever a defendant is simply found not guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, all we say without any additional information is that it is much more likely that the
defendant was, in fact, factually guilty rather than factually innocent.
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available DNA results, not softer measures of innocence66 or pseudonymous
determinations of “innocence” that cannot be verified.67
It is important to note that Risinger’s conclusions ultimately rest on a very
small number of wrongful convictions—a total of only 11.68 It can be argued that
reaching broad conclusions about the nation’s criminal justice system from such a
small sample builds on a limited foundation.69 But even more important, relying on
Risinger’s sample from capital rape-murder cases as an estimate of wrongful
convictions for other cases—such as the general category of violent crime cases this
Article focuses on—almost certainly produces a result that is too high. Indeed,
Risinger himself cautioned about broad extrapolations, warning (quite properly) that
the criminal justice system is “substructured,” with different error rates for different
kinds of crimes.70
To reach a more generally applicable error-rate figure, we can start with
the fact that Risinger himself concluded that, within his sample, a 5% error rate was
a “fairly generous likely maximum,” expanded from the 3.3% wrongful convictions
figure actually demonstrated through DNA.71 If we want an empirically grounded
rate, we might reasonably take Risinger’s own reported 3.3% figure as a starting
point.72
In trying to reach broader conclusions about system-wide error rates, it is
important to understand that Risinger’s data comes from capital rape-murder cases,
(and it is worth noting that comparable error rates in capital cases have been reported
in one other recent study73). This rate of reported exonerations in capital cases is far
higher than for any other category of criminal conviction—by a disproportion of
about 130 to 1.74 This may be, in part, because such significant resources are devoted
to litigating capital cases. But beyond that, many in the innocence movement have
66.
The National Registry of Exonerations includes as an “exonerated” person any
person who is convicted, has the conviction overturned, and then is acquitted on retrial. See
Glossary,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Oct. 2,
2018). This broad definition results in the inclusion of many people who would seem highly
likely to be factually guilty. See infra note 174 (discussing similarly problematic Death
Penalty Information Center list of innocents).
67.
See, e.g., supra note 64 (discussing Urban Institute study).
68.
Risinger, supra note 53, at 773–74.
69.
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants
Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230, 7233 (2014) (“[Risinger’s
3.3% estimate], however, is based on a small number of exonerations
(n = 11).”).
70.
Risinger, supra note 53, at 783.
71.
Id. at 780.
72.
It is also possible to fold Risinger’s 5% maximum error rate into the
calculation, as discussed in infra notes 172–174 and accompanying text.
73.
See Gross et al., supra note 73, at 7233 (4.1% error-rate figure, with sensitivity
analysis extending both higher and lower).
74.
See id. (death sentences represent less than 0.10% of prison sentences in the
United States, but they accounted for about 12% of known exonerations of innocence
defendants from 1989 through early 2012); see also Gross, supra note 12, at 757
tbl. 1 (collecting exonerations by crime in the National Registry).
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suggested that capital cases may, paradoxically, produce higher error rates than other
types of cases.75 And even passing by that troubling possibility, rape cases also may
be more error prone than other types of cases.76
Risinger derived his error-rate figure by narrowing the general category of
capital cases to those involving both a stranger rape and an intentional murder.77
These cases appear to be one of the primary types of cases where wrongful
convictions have been discovered through DNA. And most important for present
purposes, these are also the types of cases where wrongful convictions are
disproportionately likely to occur. As Professor Gross has explained, in murder
cases “extraordinary pressure [mounts] to secure convictions for [such] heinous
crimes.”78 In addition, the police may be more prone to misidentifying innocent
people as perpetrators given the unavailability of victims to provide first-hand
information. Police also devote tremendous resources to solving murders, unlike
other crimes of violence.79 The net result of these factors may well be that the risk
of a wrongful conviction is, unexpectedly, greater for rape-homicides than for less
serious crimes.
In a significant recent article, Professor Gross has helpfully calculated an
estimated “relative exoneration” rate for various crimes by looking at the number of
exonerations in the National Registry of Exonerations (an important private website
he created that tries to track cases of wrongful convictions80) for various crime
categories divided by the total number of convictions for those crime categories.81
For the years 1996 to 2004, setting robbery as the base from which to calculate
75.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions
Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 474–97 (1996); Gross et al., supra note
73, at 7235 (“[T]here are theoretical reasons to believe that the rate of false conviction may
be higher for murders in general, and for capital murders in particular, than for other felony
convictions, primarily because the authorities are more likely to pursue difficult cases with
weak evidence of guilt if one or more people have been killed.”); Scott Phillips & Jamie
Richardson, The Worst of the Worst: Heinous Crimes and Erroneous Evidence, 45 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 417, 421 (2016) (suggesting that the “worst of the worst crimes” produce the “worst
of the worst evidence”).
76.
See GARRETT, supra note 35, at 184; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 103 (2008) (noting high rates of acquittals in rape trials, as well as
high attrition rates in other ways).
77.
Risinger, supra note 53, at 770–72.
78.
See Gross et al., supra note 54, at 532.
79.
Id. at 542.
80.
See
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
According to its website, the Registry attempts to provide comprehensive information on
exonerations of innocent criminal defendants to prevent future false convictions. Our
Mission,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx (last visited Oct. 19,
2018). The helpful website lists close to 2,000 cases, which are searchable in various ways.
Browse
Cases,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Oct. 19,
2108). One problem with the Registry is that it appears to use a very loose definition of who
counts as an innocent person. See infra note 174.
81.
Gross, supra note 12, at 766.
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relative exoneration rates, Gross determined the exoneration rate for rape was 8.5
times higher, the exoneration rate for noncapital murder 37 times higher, and the
exoneration rate for death sentences 210 times higher.82
The issues raised by these numbers are important. Recall that Risinger’s
error-rate estimate rested on a sample of death sentences. If we take Gross’s numbers
as demonstrating that the error rate for capital sentences is more than 200 times
higher than that for robbery—and that robbery crimes are far more typical than are
capital cases—then a more broadly applicable error-rate estimate would need to be
reduced dramatically.
While Professor Gross advances reasons for believing that discovered error
rates in capital cases may be higher than for other crimes, it seems unlikely the actual
rate would be higher by a factor of 200. A significant reason for these reported
disparities is probably the difference in detecting wrongful convictions. Capital
cases received extraordinary scrutiny, not only by defense attorneys and innocence
projects, but also by governors and state and federal judges.83 The result is that an
error in a death penalty case is far more likely to be detected.84 Similarly, with regard
to rape cases, the availability of physical evidence left at the scene of the rape might
permit exonerations through DNA testing or other means that are not possible for
most robberies.85
My interest here is in reaching a figure not just for trials of certain capital
rape-murders but for the broader category of all violent crimes. Most reported
exonerations (about 82%) have been for violent crimes.86 Violent crimes are
conventionally defined (under the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports definition) as
comprising murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.87 Of all arrests for violent crimes, almost 3 out of 4 (74%) are
for aggravated assault,88 so it may be useful to compare the typical investigation of
a capital rape-murder with that of an aggravated assault.
As a representative example of a capital rape-murder investigation, we can
simply take the first of the eleven cases in Risinger’s sample: Nicholas Yarris.89 In
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 757. Of course, this is not to assert that wrongful convictions are less
likely to occur for nonviolent crime cases. It could be that more resources are devoted to
identifying wrongful convictions in violent crime cases because the collateral consequences
of such an error (e.g., a lengthy term of imprisonment) are much greater.
87.
See, e.g., Violent Crime, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REP. 2017,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/violent-crime
(last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
88.
See Table 29: Estimated Number of Arrests, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REP. 2010
(last visited Oct. 19, 2018). An additional 20% are for robbery, and robbers may be more
likely to be sent to prison and spend more time once sent there. See Gross et al., supra note
54, at 529 (noting more state prisoners incarcerated for robbery than assault).
89.
See generally Commonwealth v. Yarris, 549 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1988). In an effort
to avoid cherry picking, I chose the Yarris case for close analysis, simply because it was the
first one Risinger lists in his sample, see Risinger, supra note 53, at 770–71 n.14, and because
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1981, a few days after the police discovered the body of a woman who had been
brutally raped and murdered, an officer stopped Yarris for a traffic violation.90 The
routine stop escalated into a violent confrontation between Yarris (who was addicted
to methamphetamine) and the patrolman and ended in Yarris’s arrest for trying to
kill the officer.91 While under arrest for this offense, in a gambit to gain his freedom
Yarris accused an acquaintance of committing the earlier rape-murder (an
accusation, according to Yarris, which was the product of police coercion).92 When
police excluded the acquaintance as a viable candidate, Yarris became the prime
suspect.93 Conventional serological testing was performed on the rape kit, the results
of which could not definitely exclude Yarris.94 In 1982, prosecutors convicted Yarris
by relying on the ambiguous biological evidence, as well as the testimony of a
jailhouse informant and the victim’s coworkers, who identified Yarris as the man
seen harassing the victim shortly before she was killed.95 After the conviction, it was
suggested that the prosecution may have withheld exculpatory evidence from the
defense—gloves that did not fit Yarris, which were connected to the murder.96 Yarris
was ultimately released in 2004 based on DNA evidence that excluded him.97
(Yarris, however, was for much of this time simultaneously serving a 30-year prison
sentence for a prison escape in Florida.)98
The Yarris case involves at least five risk factors for a wrongful conviction:
(1) shaky eyewitness identification; (2) possibly coerced statements during custody;
(3) withheld exculpatory evidence; (4) a jailhouse informant; and (5) inconclusive
but seemingly inculpatory forensic evidence.99 Such risk factors are not present in
typical criminal investigations for more routine crimes such as aggravated assault.
The criminology literature persuasively documents that most serious, reported
crimes receive only superficial attention from investigators.100 “The single most
important determinant of whether a crime will be solved is the information the
victim supplies immediately to the responding patrol officer.”101 If police are unable
to obtain information uniquely identifying the perpetrator when they first receive a
report of a crime, the perpetrator by and large will never be subsequently
on initial examination it appeared to be generally representative of the other cases in
Risinger’s sample. For citations to additional authorities setting out the facts of the case, see
the Appendix below.
90.
Nicholas
Yarris,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3771
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2018).
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.; see also Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2006).
100.
JOHN E. ECK, SOLVING CRIMES: THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND
ROBBERY 16 (1983).
101.
Id. at 24 (citing [1 SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS] PETER W.
GREENWOOD & JOAN PETERSILIA, THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (1975)).
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identified.102 Generally speaking, “if a suspect is neither known to the victim nor
arrested at the scene of the crime, the chances of ever arresting him are very slim.”103
Confirming this conclusion, one widely cited study found that of ten
aggravated assault cases that police had solved, all ten were solved by “routine initial
ID,” and none were solved by more extended techniques such as a photo ID lineup,
interrogation, fingerprints, or other forms of investigation.104 A much larger sample
of cases in Kansas found that 94% of the aggravated assault cases were solved
through initial identification.105 According to the Rand researchers who conducted
the study, this data “again confirm that the great majority of cleared crimes are
solved because the identity of the perpetrator is already known when the crime report
reaches the investigator.”106
Clearance rates for assault cases tend to be higher than other categories of
common crimes—e.g., burglaries—because police often immediately receive a
report of who committed the assault. For example, one study reported that police
had a named suspect in 75% of the assault cases (but only 5% of burglary cases).107
Because of the fact that the victim and offender are often immediately known to
each other in the aggravated assault crimes (or a suspect is immediately apprehended
at the scene), investigations of the crimes are frequently straightforward affairs, and
arrests occur quickly—often in less than one hour, as reported in one study.108 Many
of the offenders were using alcohol at the time of the crime.109 For all these reasons,
aggravated assaults are solved (or “cleared by arrest” in the nomenclature of the
Uniform Crime Reports) about 56.4% of the time, a higher rate than any other crime
apart from homicide (where significant resources are invested to increase clearance
rates).110
The fact that police clear aggravated assault cases rapidly based on initial
information helps paint a picture of typical assault cases. They often involve such
things as bar-room fights or escalating domestic violence situations, where
determining “whodunit” is not the question. Taking error rates from complex rape102.
Id.
103.
U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 8 (1967).
104.
[3 OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS] PETER W. GREENWOOD, JAN M. CHAIKEN,
JOAN PETERSILIA & LINDA PRUSOFF, THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS 66–77 (1975).
105.
Id. at 77.
106.
Id. at 78.
107.
Herbert H. Isaacs, A Study of Communications, Crimes, and Arrests in
Metropolitan Police Department, in TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 103, at 88, 97.
108.
See Arnita D. Varnedoe, Characteristics of Offenders Arrested for Aggravated
Assault: A Test of Easterlin’s Hypothesis 8 (May 1, 1987) (unpublished M.A thesis, Atlanta
University),
http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3091&context=dissertations.
109.
See, e.g., Alcohol & Crime: Data from 2002 to 2008, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/acf/apt1_crimes_by_type.cfm (last visited Sep. 13, 2018)
(approximately 21.1% of aggravated assaults in 2008 involved offenders using alcohol)
110.
Table 25: Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means, FBI:
UNIFORM CRIME REP. 2010, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.2010/tables/10tbl25.xls (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
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murder investigations and applying them to these kinds of simple cases will
invariably and significantly overstate the frequency of wrongful convictions.
In this connection, it is interesting to observe that within the National
Registry of Exonerations, assault cases are only a tiny fraction—about 4%.111 Given
the large number of assaults prosecuted in the criminal justice system, this appears
to suggest that assault cases are particularly unlikely to produce wrongful
convictions.112
2.

The Typicality of the Error-Rate Samples

In trying to determine a more broadly applicable wrongful conviction trial
rate, it is also instructive to consider whether Risinger’s error-rate figure is even
typical of homicide cases. It seems likely that, even for such crimes, Risinger’s
sample significantly overstates the frequency of wrongful convictions. To take one
straightforward example, consider manslaughter cases—i.e., cases in which the
defendant concedes that he killed the victim but argues that he was provoked or
acting in self-defense. For such cases, the wrongful conviction rate—specifically the
“wrong person” conviction rate at issue in this article113—is, by definition, 0.0%,
because the identity of the killer in such cases is undisputed.
For an illustration of this point, we might look to the 267 cases discussed
in Professor Nourse’s well-known article regarding “passion murder cases.”114 She
collected all intimate-homicide cases from 1980 to 1995 in which a murder
defendant asserted a defense based on the Model Penal Code’s defense of Extreme
Emotional Disturbance (EED) compared to samples drawn from jurisdictions
following more traditional definitions of the defense.115 She provided a brief
summary of each of the cases in her study. For example, the very first case listed
involved the following situation:

111.
See Gross, supra note 12, at 757. Note that this figure is apparently for all
assaults, both aggravated and simple, which further underscores how underrepresented
aggravated assaults are in the Registry.
112.
This conclusion is not free from doubt. It may be that assault cases are unlikely
to leave behind physical evidence that can be analyzed and later exonerate a suspect. See
Gross & O’Brien, supra note 38, at 938 (noting that robberies are likely underrepresented
among exonerees compared to rapes due to the presence of physical evidence in rape cases).
But some assaults might leave behind physical evidence. And it is interesting that assaults are
also underrepresented compared to robberies—a kind of crime for which the presence of
physical evidence might be roughly comparable. In the National Registry of Exonerations,
roughly 5% of all cases are robberies and 4% are assaults of all varieties. Gross, supra note
12, at 757. Yet the number of robbery arrests is a fraction of the number of assault arrests—
less than 10%. See, e.g., Table 18: Estimated Number of Arrests, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REP.
2016,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topicpages/tables/table-18 (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (95,000 arrests for robbery; 383,000 for
aggravated assault; and 1,078,000 arrests for “other assaults”).
113.
See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
114.
Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
115.
Id. at 1345–47. It appears that her sample consisted entirely of trials, not pleas.
See id. at 1350.
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[The] victim sought to terminate her relationship with the defendant, who
had a history of psychological problems. According to the defendant’s
testimony, the victim attended a party with the defendant and thereafter
told the defendant not to believe that they would get back together. As they
were driving home, the defendant got angry, pulled a shotgun from the
trunk, and killed [her].116
If we use this collection of homicide cases to estimate a more broadly
applicable trial error rate, the rate would be 0.0%. To be sure, a jury may mistakenly
reject the claims of a defendant seeking a reduction from murder to manslaughter.
But no one argues that these kinds of mistakes are the type of wrongful conviction
under discussion.117 Thus, just as Risinger was able to compute an error rate for a
“significant subset of cases” in the criminal justice system (capital rape-murder
cases in the 1980s),118 it is possible to even more precisely calculate an error rate for
a much larger number of cases: manslaughter cases, where the error rate is 0.0% and
factually innocent people are in no way at risk of wrongful conviction. This “subset”
of homicide cases vastly outnumbers the subset Risinger is examining. By some
measures, manslaughter convictions are about as frequent as murder convictions119
(and capital murder convictions are, of course, a tiny fraction of all murder
convictions).
This point can be readily extended to many other crimes. Indeed, it is quite
likely that many violent crime cases do not present any realistic chance of a factually
innocent person being convicted. In the bar-room-fight case, there may be no real
dispute about who the two combatants were, but only a dispute about who was the
first aggressor. Or, to take another common illustration, consider a defendant who
admits he had sex with a woman and then later is charged with “date rape.” He
cannot be wrongfully convicted in the sense of being misidentified by the victim or
through shoddy forensic evidence. Instead, the issue in the case will be his state of
mind—did he knowingly coerce sex from an unwilling partner—which raises
questions of legal innocence not factual innocence.120
Many important categories of cases in our criminal justice system involve
situations where identifying whodunit is not the issue and thus “wrong person”
convictions are not realistically possible. A partial list of the categories would
include cases of:
●

manslaughter, where the defendant argues he or she committed the killing
but was provoked or disturbed;

116.
Id. at 1415 (describing State v. Forrest, 578 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 1990) (internal
citations and quotations omitted)).
117.
See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text (discussing definition of
“wrongful conviction”).
118.
Risinger, supra note 53, at 767.
119.
See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER
AND MANSLAUGHTER 101 n.9 (1998).
120.
See Risinger, supra note 53, at 762 n.2 (defining “factual innocence” as
excluding situations where someone has performed the actus reus of the crime).
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lovers’ quarrels, romantic triangles, and other argument situations in the
presence of unchallenged witnesses or where the defendant does not
dispute the killing;
killings and assaults where the defendant raises self-defense and imperfect
self-defense claims;
date rape and other sex offenses where the issue is not whether the
defendant had sex with the alleged victim, but rather whether the defendant
knowingly obtained nonconsensual sex;
bar-room fights and other mutual-combat situations in public settings with
multiple eyewitnesses;
crimes where a defense of diminished capacity or insanity is presented;
fraud where the defendant concedes the transactions but argues lack of
fraudulent intent;
possession (including drugs and firearms cases) where the defendant is
caught red-handed and cannot plausibly dispute possession;
domestic violence where the parties contest who was the first aggressor;
immigration offenses where the defendant is illegally in the country; and
drunk driving and other public order offenses.

This list could easily be expanded, but the essential point is that, for
quantification of risk, we need to think carefully before directly extrapolating from
an error rate in one kind of case to an error rate across the entire American criminal
justice system.121 For present purposes, the key point is that applying the 3.3% errorrate figure from capital rape-murder cases will significantly overstate the trial error
rate in more typical, violent crime cases where identification of the perpetrator is
not the question.
The difficult issue is determining how much of an overstatement exists.
Some measure may be provided by a recent National Crime Victimization Survey
(based on reports from crime victims), which reveals that a minority (about 39.2%)
of total violent crimes were committed by strangers, including 42.3% of aggravated
assaults, 51.7% of robberies, and 24.1% of rape/sexual assaults.122 Another measure
comes from the Uniform Crime Reports (based on reports from local law
enforcement agencies), which indicates that only about 21% of all homicides were
committed by strangers.123 Taken together, the data show that most violent crimes
do not involve unknown stranger perpetrators. And yet Risinger’s sample of capital
121.
Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
699, 702 (2014) (applying the Allen-Laudan error rate to one million state court convictions
to produce 5,000 wrongful convictions a year); George C. Thomas III, Two Windows into
Innocence, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 575, 577-78 (2010) (applying 2% error-rate figure from
English plea-bargain practice to produce figure of 40,000 wrongful American felony
convictions per year); see also Koppl & Sacks, supra note 12, at 130–31 (discussing
extrapolations from Risinger error rate).
122.
ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: VIOLENT
VICTIMIZATION COMMITTED BY STRANGERS, 1993–2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs9310.pdf.
123.
ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., HOMICIDE
TRENDS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
1980–2008,
at
18
(2011),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.
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rape-murders involves a far higher percentage of cases involving stranger
perpetrators; indeed, it appears that all of his 11 cases involved stranger crimes, like
the one Yarris was suspected of committing,124 thus requiring extensive law
enforcement efforts to solve.
Stranger-perpetrated crimes are by far the most likely areas for wrongful
convictions.125 For example, one of the most common causes of wrongful
convictions—eyewitness misidentification126—is, according to Professor Gross,
“almost entirely restricted to crimes committed by strangers.”127
In contrast, most aggravated assaults are not committed by strangers.128
And even among the stranger-perpetrated cases in aggravated assault cases,
“whodunit” issues will not always be present—such as when a drunken man at a bar
gets in a fight and is apprehended in the presence of numerous eyewitnesses.129
One way of deriving a figure for the overstatement is taking Risinger’s
3.3% error rate in capital rape-murder cases (which are almost exclusively strangerperpetrated cases) and noting that only 21% of homicides are committed by
strangers.130 Even among stranger-perpetrated killings, many of the cases will not
be candidates for wrongful conviction (such as when the defendant/stranger claims
insanity or self-defense), although there will certainly be some nonstrangerperpetrated cases where wrongful convictions are possible.
Considering all this data, it is obvious that Risinger’s 3.3% error-rate figure
vastly overstates the error rate for violent crime cases. Using homicides overstates
the likely error rate, and many violent crime cases do not contain the kinds of
convictions—e.g., crimes perpetrated by strangers—where wrongful convictions are
likely to occur. Evaluating the data presented above in light of these facts, it seems
a reasonable (and perhaps slightly overstated) estimate to conclude that it is unlikely
for the conditions for wrongful convictions to exist in more than about 25% of
violent crime cases.
In sum, we can, for extrapolation purposes,131 reduce Risinger’s 3.3% trial
error-rate figure as ultimately suggesting a (possibly overstated) figure across all
violent crimes of about 0.82%—i.e., 25% of Risinger’s reported 3.3% error rate.

124.
See Risinger, supra note 53, at 770 n.14 (listing cases).
125.
See Gross & O’Brien, supra note 38, at 940–41 (raising this point).
126.
See Garrett, supra note 24, at 45 (noting 72% of DNA-exoneration cases
involved eyewitness misidentification).
127.
Gross et al., supra note 54, at 530.
128.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
129.
Many aggravated assault cases involve close-quarters combat. About 27% of
aggravated assaults involve personal weapons such as hands, fists, and feet, and 19% involved
knives or other cutting instruments. See Table 22: Aggravated Assault, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME
REP. 2011, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-22
(last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
130.
COOPER & SMITH, supra note 123, at 18.
131.
The extrapolation here assumes that the figures cited above, which involve all
cases (not just trial) are roughly applicable to trial cases, for which we are calculating the
error rate.
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Current Error Rates in Light of Advancing DNA and Other Improved
Forensic Technologies

One final factor remaining to be considered is that Risinger drew his
sample from crimes committed long ago. Risinger’s sample consists of a group of
capital rape-murders in the 1980s.132 It was this unique time period that then
permitted Risinger to find examples of errors—errors detected through subsequently
developed DNA technology. Indeed, all of the wrongful convictions that Risinger
identified came (at least in part) from so-called “DNA exonerations.”133
But, of course, we now live in a world where DNA technology is widely
available to law enforcement134 and certainly would be used in any capital rapemurder prosecution instituted. And given the greater precision of DNA technology
over older technologies, if these same cases arose today, DNA evidence would have
prevented the initial wrongful prosecution—and even if a prosecution was initiated,
any ultimate wrongful conviction—from ever occurring.
As an illustration of this point, consider the Nicholas Yarris case described
above.135 At the crime scene of the 1981 rape-murder, police collected biological
evidence from the victim’s body, including sperm samples and fingernail
scrapings.136 Police also found gloves believed to have been left by the perpetrator
in the victim’s car.137 Police then performed conventional serological testing on the
evidence, which could not exclude Yarris.138 Indeed, at trial, the prosecution
affirmatively argued that the testing of blood and body fluids placed Yarris within
the approximately 13% of the male population who might have raped the victim.139
After Yarris was convicted, he began an effort to obtain DNA testing of the
evidence.140 In 2003, Dr. Edward Blake conducted retesting of the evidence, which
showed that profiles obtained from the gloves and the spermatozoa evidence
appeared to originate from the same person.141 Yarris was excluded from all
biological material connected with the crime.142
Of course, if the Yarris case were to unfold today, DNA testing would be
readily available to the police and prosecution at the outset. And Yarris would thus
be excluded as a possible perpetrator, and rape-murder charges would never be
132.
See Risinger, supra note 53, at 770–72.
133.
See the Appendix to this Article.
134.
All 50 states and Congress have adopted some form of post-conviction DNA
legislation, and the technology is now widely used. See Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity
Units Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705, 715 (2017).
135.
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 549 A.2d 513, 522 (Pa. 1988) (discussed in supra
note 89–98 and accompanying text).
136.
Nicholas Yarris, supra note 90.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Yarris, 549 A.2d at 522.
140.
Mario Cacciottolo, Nick Yarris: “How I Survived 22 Years on Death Row”,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37974904.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.; see also Cacciottolo, supra note 140. See generally NICK YARRIS, THE
FEAR OF 13: COUNTDOWN TO EXECUTION: MY FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL ON DEATH ROW (2016).
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pursued against him. In other words, unsurprisingly, the criminal justice system
today will be more accurate than it was back in the early 1980s in handling cases
like Yarris’s.
The Yarris case is typical of the 11 cases in the Risinger sample—i.e., in
all of the other 10 cases it is virtually impossible that any of the defendants would
be convicted today given the greater power of DNA technology to pinpoint
connections (or lack thereof) between a suspect and crime scene evidence. The
Appendix to this Article reviews each of the cases and explains this conclusion.
This march-of-science point has tremendous implications for calculating a
current justice system error rate. For example, anyone relying exclusively on
Risinger’s 3.3% error rate as a basis for extrapolating errors across the system would
need to substitute a different error rate—0.0%—as the empirically grounded
component of the Risinger figure applicable today. And other studies similar to
Risinger’s relying on erroneous convictions from long ago would produce an
overstated error rate if used to estimate a present-day wrongful conviction rate.143
Looking more broadly beyond just the Risinger sample, an important point
is that we should expect the wrongful conviction rate in this country to have
exhibited a decisive downward trend over the last several decades. Although this
trend is rarely discussed in the innocence literature,144 innocence scholars can quite
properly and proudly take credit for initiating many recent reforms designed to
prevent the conviction of the innocent in America’s criminal justice system. As one
recent review concluded, the Innocence Movement has resulted in “widespread
systemic reform, including greater DNA collection and testing, changes to police
investigative procedures, rules to prevent prosecutorial misconduct, increased
funding for capital defense attorneys, and higher standards for attorneys
representing these clients.”145 While these reforms are imperfect, they certainly have
improved how cases involving innocent people are processed in the criminal justice
system and should be producing real reductions from whatever the wrongful
conviction rate previously was.146
143.
See, e.g., Gross & O’Brien, supra note 38, at 946 (estimating 2.3% wrongful
conviction rate in death sentences imposed between 1973 and 1989); Gross et al., supra note
69, at 7233 (estimating 4.1% “exoneration” rate in death sentences imposed between 1973
and 2004). Gross et al.’s estimates are discussed in more detail at infra note 173.
144.
One exception is the brief reference to trends by Professor Gross and his
colleagues in their recent study of death-sentence error rates. They raise the possibility that
“the death-sentencing rate of innocent defendants has changed over time.” Gross et al., supra
note 69, at 7235. However, they conclude that “[n]o specific evidence points in that direction,
but the number and the distribution of death sentences have changed dramatically in the past
15 years.” Id. They cite trends on the number of death sentences imposed, which moved from
137 in 1977, to a high of 315 in 1996, to 138 in 2004 (the last year of their study). Id. at n.22.
These dramatic fluctuations in the number of death sentences, for reasons presumably having
little to do with reliability issues, mean that a search for trend lines must rely on data other
than that collected in death penalty cases.
145.
Lara A. Bazelon, The Long Goodbye: After the Innocence Movement, Does
the Attorney-Client Relationship Ever End?, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 700–01
(2016) (internal quotations omitted).
146.
Changes have also been made to post-conviction procedures to help exonerate
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As an illustration, consider how one important cause of wrongful
convictions—false confessions147—has been treated over time. Beginning around
the 1990s, increasing awareness of false confessions led to a call for recording police
interrogations.148 Several scholars (including me) argued that recording could help
prevent wrongful convictions from false confessions (particularly of intellectually
disabled suspects) by restraining improper police coercion and allowing later
impartial reconstruction of what happened during a custodial interrogation.149 While
recording is not universally used today, it is clearly spreading among police
agencies: one recent survey reports that “[s]ince 2003, the number of states requiring
law enforcement officers to electronically record some or all interviews conducted
with suspects in their custody has grown from two to at least twenty-two.”150 This
trend is likely to accelerate as the use of body cameras becomes more widespread
among law enforcement.151
Law enforcement training on avoiding false confessions has also
significantly expanded in recent years; for example, the most widely used police
interrogation training manual (the Inbau-Reid Manual) had no discussion of the
topic of false confessions in its 1986 edition but an entire 40-page chapter in its 2013
edition.152
Defense attorneys, too, are now much better positioned to explain to juries
how a suspect might have falsely confessed. In appropriate cases, false confession
experts are sometimes allowed to testify and can help the jury understand, for
example, the unique psychological disabilities that may have caused a person to
falsely confess.153

the innocent after a wrongful conviction. See Brandon L. Garrett, Towards an International
Right to Claim Innocence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (2017). Because such reforms do
not affect the initial wrongful conviction rate, they are not considered here.
147.
See Garrett, supra note 24, at 46 (confession evidence introduced in 21% of
DNA-exoneration cases).
148.
CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION
85 (1993).
149.
See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 387, 486–89 (1996) (calling for videotaping as a replacement for Miranda
and citing others who had reached a similar conclusion); Cassell, supra note 46, at 553–54
(arguing for videotaping to protect the innocent); see also Cassell, supra note 17, at 583–90
(discussing intellectual disabilities and false confessions).
150.
Dep’t of Justice, New Department Policy Concerning Electronic Recording of
Statements, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1552, 1552 (2015).
151.
See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review
of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97
B.U. L. REV. 685, 839–40 (2017).
152.
Compare FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(3d ed. 1986) (no entry for “false confessions” in index), with FRED E. INBAU ET. AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 339–78 (5th ed. 2013) (discussing
“distinguishing between true and false confessions,” summarizing false confession research,
and providing ways to evaluate confession trustworthiness).
153.
See, e.g., Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 205, 207–08 (Va. 2002)
(testimony of defense expert witness on issue of defendant’s “mental retardation” and the
susceptibility of such persons to suggestive police interrogation was admissible). Indeed, the
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The area of false confessions is not the only one where advances in
technology and legal procedures should be producing reductions in wrongful
convictions. In the interests of brevity, just a quick survey of some other illustrative
advancements may be useful.
Flawed forensic science has been a leading cause of wrongful
convictions,154 and forensic science is an area of considerable recent improvement
in the system.155 DNA technology is just one example of the way in which the
criminal justice system now possesses much more accurate tools for separating
guilty from innocent suspects, particularly in the kinds of high profile cases that
create pressures that might produce wrongful convictions.156 And as new
technologies have marched on, jurors have come to expect more rigorous scientific
investigation before returning guilty verdicts—the “CSI effect.”157
Concern about innocence issues has also led to several reform
commissions. For example, in 2009, the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences published an important report entitled Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward.158 The report contained many
recommendations for improving forensic science, including many areas (such as
odontology/bite marks disciplines) which had created risks of wrongful
convictions.159 In 2014, the Council released a comprehensive report on the science
of eyewitness identification practices in the United States. The report, Identifying
the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification,160 recommended that law
enforcement adopt a series of practices designed to reduce eyewitness mistakes—
another common cause of wrongful convictions.161

problem today may be that some defense false confession experts go too far in claiming that
confessions are false. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipos, 849 F.3d 464, 471–72 (1st Cir.
2017) (affirming district court decision to exclude false confession testimony from Richard
Leo because it would “introduce the jury . . . to a kind of faux science”), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 683 (2018).
154.
See Garrett, supra note 24, at 48 (74% of DNA-exoneration cases involved
forensic testimony); cf. Gross, supra note 12, at 770 (using a different methodology and
finding “perjury or false accusation” to be the leading cause).
155.
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Scandal, Fraud, and the Reform of Forensic Science:
The Case of Fingerprint Analysis, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 523, 524 (2016).
156.
See Donald A. Dripps, Miranda for the Next Fifty Years: Why the Fifth
Amendment Should Go Fourth, 97 B.U. L. REV. 893, 921 (2017).
157.
See Hon. Donald E. Shelto, The “CSI Effect”: Does it Really Exist?, NAT’L
INST. JUST. (Mar. 17, 2018) https://www.nij.gov/journals/259/pages/csi-effect.aspx.
158.
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
159.
Id.
160.
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES,
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014),
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18891/identifying-the-culprit-assessing-eyewitnessidentification.
161.
See Garrett, supra note 24, at 46 (eyewitness identification evidence
introduced in 72% of DNA-exoneration cases).
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Law enforcement agencies have also looked at their own practices. For
example, in 2016, the Justice Department and the FBI formally acknowledged that
nearly every microscopic-hair-comparison examiner had given testimony that
overstated matches in a way that favored the prosecution.162 The Department
committed to working to improve its practices in the future.163 In 2014 in Houston,
after a series of problems with a police-operated crime lab, a new and independent
laboratory (the Houston Forensic Science Center) opened.164
States, too, have looked into preventing wrongful convictions. For
example, the New York State Bar Association assembled a Task Force on Wrongful
Convictions and in 2009 issued a report with a series of recommendations on
criminal justice issues.165 The Texas Forensic Science Commission has taken a hard
look at questionable forensic practices and has become, according to many accounts,
a model for how to assess forensic evidence.166
Prosecutors have likewise made changes. Some large offices have
established conviction-integrity programs specifically designed to prevent and
correct wrongful convictions.167 One recent review of these programs by a leading
innocence litigator, Barry Scheck, concluded that they “may have a surprisingly
good chance of succeeding.”168
This is just a brief collection of what can fairly be described as a flurry of
recent efforts throughout the criminal justice system addressing innocence issues.
To be sure, progress in implementing innocence reforms has been uneven,169 and no
162.
Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH.
POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensichair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/.
163.
Id.
164.
SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, COPS IN LAB COATS: CURBING WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES 222–23 (2015).
165.
See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
(2009),
https://www.nysba.org/wcreport.
166.
See, e.g., Trevor Rosson, A New Remedy for Junk Science: Article 11.073 and
Texas’s Response to the Changing Landscape in the Forensic Sciences, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J.
465, 478 (2017) (“[T]oday the TFSC stands as a model for the nation in its determination to
find solutions to problems in the forensic sciences.”).
167.
See, e.g., CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW’S CONVICTION INTEGRITY
PROJECT, ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS IN PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES
(2012),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Establishing_Conviction_Inte
grity_Programs_FinalReport_ecm_pro_073583.pdf;
Eric
S.
Fish,
Prosecutorial
Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 304 (2017) (“[A] growing number of prosecutors’
offices have established ‘conviction integrity units’ that seek to identify wrongfully convicted
prisoners. Such units exist in twelve states, as well as Washington D.C, and more are being
added.”).
168.
Scheck, supra note 134, at 713.
169.
Garrett, supra note 24, at 47; cf. Notice of Public Comment on Advancing
Forensic Science, 82 Fed. Reg. 17879 (Apr. 13, 2017) (announcing that the National
Commission on Forensic Science would not be extended for a third term, but seeking public
comment on how to advance the practice of forensic science in light of work by the
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one believes that the problem of wrongful convictions has been eliminated. But the
salient point is that clear progress is being made toward addressing the wrongful
conviction problem. And that progress should mean that the wrongful conviction
rate in America today is noticeably lower than it was in earlier decades.
As a means of trying to (cautiously) identify what kind of trial error rate
might exist in the system today, we can return to the Risinger sample. In highlighting
11 cases of wrongful conviction in his sample of cases from 1982 to 1989, Risinger
also reviewed the other cases in his sample to try to determine if additional errors
beyond those revealed by DNA testing might occur.170 Risinger identified his 3.3%
error rate as the “conservative minimum factual innocence rate” in his sample—i.e.,
the floor for the error rate.171 But he also estimated a “fairly generous likely
maximum” error—i.e., the ceiling. Risinger put this figure at 5%.172
Risinger’s estimate allows us to make a further correction of our error
rate—a correction that might even be regarded as conservative. Rather than starting
at only the 3.3% “minimum” error rate that Risinger identified, we would begin at
the 5% “likely maximum” rate that he identified based on cases prosecuted in the
1980s. But as a measure of the current wrongful conviction rate, we would have to
reduce that maximum by backing out cases that, in 2018, would never lead to
wrongful convictions because of improvements in DNA (not to mention other forms
of forensic science). Thus, at a minimum, we would back out the 3.3% of cases
where widespread DNA technology would today exclude the suspect and prevent a
wrongful conviction. This means that, even starting at Risinger’s maximum figure
of 5%, what remains is only a 1.7% (5% minus 3.3%) error rate for cases going to
trial now.173
Commission and others).
170.
Risinger, supra note 53, at 778–79.
171.
Id. at 778.
172.
Id. at 780.
173.
As a “cross-check” to this 1.7% error rate derived from Risinger’s original
5.0% figure, it is possible to compare what would happen if we make a similar adjustment to
Gross et al.’s 4.1% error-rate figure from death penalty cases from 1973 through 2004. See
Gross et al., supra note 69, at 7233. Gross et al. counted as an exoneration any case on a list
maintained by the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC). See id. at 7231 (citing The
Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-listthose-freed-death-row (last visited Sep. 13, 2018)). It appears that a substantial portion of
these exonerations (as in Risinger’s sample) come as a result of DNA analysis. For example,
while the 2014 study does not break out DNA exonerations separately, in an earlier study
Gross reported that of all exonerations listed in the National Registry of Exonerations from
1989 through 2003 about 42% came from DNA analysis. Gross et al., supra note 54, at 524.
On the other hand, the DPIC attributes about 12% of its exonerations (as of 2004, apparently
using more restrictive criteria) to DNA exonerations. Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the
Crisis in the American Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Sep. 2004),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-crisis-american-death-penalty#Sec05b.
This
suggests that, as in the case of Risinger’s data, Gross et al.’s 4.1% figure would need to be
reduced noticeably as a measure of current error rates. Id.
In addition and more worrisome, unlike Risinger’s definition of DNA
exonerations, the DPIC list that Gross et al. rely upon uses a much softer definition of
“exoneration,” which includes many people who had convictions overturned on procedural
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It might be objected that this adjustment fails to recognize that, even with
improved DNA technologies, it might still be possible for an innocent person to
wrongfully fall under suspicion. For example, in the Yarris case, as noted above, a
jailhouse informant testified that Yarris made incriminating statements.174 Perhaps,
it could be argued, that shaky testimony might be enough to obtain a conviction in
the face of a DNA “exclusion.” Such arguments seem implausible, but as a hedge
grounds after which prosecutors were unable to secure convictions by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. See The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., supra
(including as “innocent” any person who is acquitted of a crime that placed them on death
row). This loose definition opens the door to including many people as “innocent” who were
not factually innocent. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 196 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting “mischaracterization of reversible error as actual innocence is endemic in abolitionist
rhetoric” and criticizing DPIC list); see also Ward A. Campbell, Critique of DPIC List,
http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/dpic.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (reviewing specific
examples of people on DPIC list who do not appear to be “innocent” of the crimes for which
they were convicted).
A few illustrations from the DPIC list demonstrate the problem:
(1) Jay C. Smith had his death sentence overturned due to a debatable Brady
violation, but on later review of Smith’s civil-rights suit the Third Circuit concluded:
Our confidence in Smith’s convictions for the murder of Susan Reinert
and her child is not the least bit diminished by consideration [of the
withheld evidence] . . . and Smith has therefore not established that he is
entitled to compensation for the unethical conduct of some of those
involved in the prosecution.
Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2000), discussed in Marquis, supra note 17, at
521.
(2) John C. Skelton had his conviction overturned on grounds of insufficient
evidence rather than actual innocence, with the (divided) appellate court explaining that
“[a]lthough the evidence against appellant leads to strong suspicion or probability that
[Skelton] committed [the crime], we cannot say that it excludes to a moral certainty every
other reasonable hypothesis except [his] guilt.” Skelton v. State, 795 S.W.2d 162, 169 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
(3) Steven Smith had his conviction overturned on grounds of insufficient
evidence, with the appellate court explaining:
While a not guilty finding is sometimes equated with a finding of
innocence, that conclusion is erroneous. Courts do not find people guilty
or innocent. They find them guilty or not guilty. A not guilty verdict
expresses no view as to a defendant’s innocence . . . This case happens to
be a murder case carrying a sentence of death against a defendant where
the State has failed to meet its burden.
People v. Smith, 708 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Ill. 1999).
(4) Robert Cox had his conviction overturned on grounds of insufficient
evidence rather than innocence, while the reviewing court agreed that there was a “strong
suspicion” that Cox had committed the murder. Cox v. State, 555 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1990).
Some significant downward adjustment of the DPIC figures appears to be reasonable to reflect
this very soft measure of innocence.
In light of these two factors, it appears that substituting Gross et al.’s (lower)
4.1% error rate for Risinger’s 5.0% error rate does not appear to make a great difference in
the calculations offered here, and any substituted figure would certainly fall within the range
of possible error rates calculated through reliance on the Risinger figure.
174.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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against this possibility—and, again, to be very conservative in the calculation—we
might modestly increase the 1.7% current “maximum” figure suggested in the
previous paragraph to a total of 2.0%. This adjustment also allows for the possibility
that Risinger may have underestimated the maximum rate to some degree. And if
we substitute a 2.0% error rate (rather than Risinger’s 3.3%) into the calculations
made in the previous Section, we arrive at the (again, possibly overstated) figure of
a trial error rate of 0.50%—i.e., 1/4 of the 3.3% error rate, as discussed
previously175—across all violent crimes.
D. The Ratio of Wrongful Convictions Through Trials and Guilty Pleas
Once we determine an estimated error rate at trial, the next important issue
that arises is how this rate applies to cases in which a conviction is obtained through
a guilty plea. Given that the vast majority of cases are resolved by guilty pleas, the
percentage of wrongful convictions in that larger pool will substantially influence
the ultimate error-rate figure that is derived for the criminal justice system as whole.
It is clear that innocent people do, in some cases, plead guilty.176 The
significant incentives that can be offered for a guilty plea—particularly in cases
involving lengthy mandatory-minimum sentences—can place strong pressures on
an innocent person to simply take a plea deal. A possible complicating fact, as
discussed below,177 is that an innocent person may commit another crime in pleading
guilty to a crime he did not commit—perjury during the plea colloquy in attesting
under oath to his guilt. But for present purposes, the key point is that such wrongfulconviction-by-guilty-plea cases do exist.
The frequency with which innocent people plead guilty is debated.178 On
this issue, both Allen and Laudan and Risinger have offered competing positions,
with Risinger having the better of the argument, at least for purposes of determining
a current wrongful conviction rate figure. Our interest here is in determining a ratio
of wrongful convictions obtained via trials versus guilty pleas. To estimate that
figure, Allen and Laudan relied on Professor Brandon Garrett’s 2008 article
analyzing about 200 cases of DNA exonerations, in which 4.5% involved wrongful
convictions resulting from guilty pleas.179 In his 2010 article, Risinger points out
that the 4.5% figure Allen and Laudan used relied on older data, extending well
before 2008, while in 2010 the percentage of exonerations involving those who had
pled guilty collected in the National Registry of Exonerations had climbed to about
175.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
176.
See, e.g., John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually
Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014).
177.
See infra notes 213–20 and accompanying text.
178.
See, e.g., Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, Plea Bargaining’s
Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 20–21 (2013); Blume & Helm, supra
note 176; Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining’s Role in Wrongful Convictions, in EXAMINING
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: A STEP BACK, MOVING FORWARD (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds.
2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 85. See generally
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 103 YALE L.J. 1909,
1949–51 (1992).
179.
See Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 71 n.41 (citing
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008)).
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7.5%.180 By November 2015, the registry showed an even higher figure—about 15%
of their exonerations involved convictions via guilty pleas.181
Because the Registry contains a much bigger data set than the DNA
exonerations reviewed by Garrett, it seems like a reasonable starting point for a
general calculation. And it draws some additional validation from Risinger’s
remarkably prescient prediction back in 2010 that he thought the “real figure” for
the percentage of wrongful convictions via guilty plea would be “two or three or
four or more times higher” than 4.5%.182 The Registry’s current 17% figure falls
within that projected range.
Any reasonable estimate of the ratio of wrongful convictions via guilty
pleas versus trials will significantly drive down the overall wrongful conviction rate
in the system if wrongful convictions via guilty pleas are rare. And good reasons
exist for believing that the plea bargaining system produces a lower percentage of
wrongful convictions than trials.183 Recent scholarship suggests that an “innocence
effect” strongly reduces incentives for an innocent person to plead guilty. Professors
Gazal-Ayal and Tor’s 2012 article provides a good overview of the issue,184
collecting empirical evidence on the extent to which innocent people enter false
guilty pleas. Gazal-Ayal and Tor conclude that “our evidence on the significant
effect of innocence on plea behavior demonstrates that scholars’ . . . belief that plea
bargains lead innocents routinely to make false guilty pleas is overstated.”185 Based
on empirical evidence, they found an innocence effect—i.e., “that plea bargainers
are predominantly guilty, while innocents disproportionately refuse the plea and go
180.
Risinger, supra note 61, at 996 n.20.
181.
As of October 2016, the Registry reported that of 1,702 “exonerees,” 17% pled
guilty. See Gross, supra note 12, at 756; see also Innocents Who Plead Guilty, NAT’L
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf.
Part of the reason for the recent increase appears to be many cases (133) from
Houston, Texas, in which defendants pled guilty to minor drug charges before lab results were
received, and then the lab results later came back finding no illegal drugs. See Gross, supra
note 12, at 776–77. Under the simple and inexorable calculus of the Registry, no drugs means
no crime and, therefore, “factual innocence.” See Glossary, supra note 66. But from a slightly
broader perspective, most of these cases involved “bogus dope” where the defendant was
trying to buy illegal drugs and got ripped off—according to Robert Wicoff, Harris County
(Houston) Public Defender, in his private remarks at an innocence conference. See Anita
Hassan & Mike Tolson, Harris County Leads Way in 2014 Exonerations, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan.
26, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/HarrisCounty-leads-way-in-2014-exonerations-6041657.php. Such defendants are guilty of the
crime of attempted purchase of illegal drugs, and thus whether they could be included in a
compilation of “factually innocent” persons is dubious. I don’t pursue the issue further here,
because the effect of including these cases is to increase the wrongful conviction rate that this
Article derives.
182.
Risinger, supra note 61, at 995.
183.
Id. at 996. But cf. Amos N. Guiora, Relearning the Lessons of History:
Miranda and Counterterrorism, 71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (2011) (discussing pressures
exerted on defendants by police outside formal trial procedures).
184.
Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339
(2012).
185.
Id. at 345.
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to trial, which might result in their acquittal.”186 They also found that this innocence
effect means that “plea bargains lead to beneficial, lower rates of wrongful
convictions,”187 because it helps to reserve time- and resource-intensive trials for
those who are more likely to be innocent. Similar suggestions are arguably found in
recent “laboratory” studies of guilty pleas,188 although the extent to which the studies
(involving Psychology 101 students threatened with “punishment,” such as being
reported to their teachers) are applicable to serious criminal proceedings is
debatable.
To be sure, questions can be raised about whether exoneration data can
fully capture the frequency with which innocent people plead guilty.189 For example,
someone who has pled guilty may find it much more difficult to attract the attention
of courts or others to prove innocence. In light of this concern, we might take the
17% figure and acknowledge that wrongful convictions in guilty-plea cases may still
be underrepresented. We could simply increase the 17% figure to 20% to guard
against the possibility of underrepresentation, which is the conservative approach I
will take here.
E. Calculating the Wrongful Conviction Rate through Component Parts with
Current Data
Recall that to determine a wrongful conviction rate figure through the
component-parts methodology, three numbers are required: (1) a wrongful
conviction rate at trial; (2) the ratio of wrongful convictions at trial versus via plea;
and (3) the ratio of cases resolved via trial versus via plea. The previous two Sections
have discussed the first two of the three figures. The last figure is not worth extended
discussion, because fairly solid data is readily available on resolution of cases
through trials and guilty pleas. A generally applicable trial-rate figure for all violent
crimes is probably at least 95%,190 although those charged with the violent crimes
of murder and rape may be slightly less likely to plead guilty than the average
felon.191

186.
Id. at 394.
187.
Id.
188.
See, e.g., Dervan & Edkins, supra note 178, at 34–35 (89.2% of guilty students
accepted “plea” vs. 56.4% of innocent students).
189.
Id. at 21.
190.
See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s Innocent
Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 84 (more than 95% guilty-plea
rate); BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES,
2009–STATISTICAL
TABLES,
at
24
tbl.21
(2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (of felony defendants, 66% convicted
overall and 65% overall convicted via plea, suggesting a plea rate of around 98% (65/66)
based on summing convicted via felony and misdemeanor pleas).
191.
See Gross et al., supra note 54, at 536 n.30 (noting that 90% of those convicted
of violent felony in large, urban counties in 1998 pled guilty). Recent data show guilty-plea
rates of about 73% for murder, 90% for rape, 97% for robbery, 95% for assault, and 96% for
other violent crimes. REAVES, supra note 190, at 24 tbl.21 (based on summing convicted via
felony and misdemeanor pleas and dividing by total convicted). Given the predominance of
assault and robbery crimes for the violent crime figure this Article attempts to calculate, a
95% plea rate seems a reasonable estimate.
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With the relevant figure in place, we are now able to calculate a wrongful
conviction rate using the component-parts methodology as follows:
.0050 trial error rate
x
20/80 ratio of wrongful convictions in guilty pleas versus trial
x
5/95 overall ratio of trials to pleas
=
.000066, or 0.0066%, or 0.66 wrongful convictions out of 10,000 guilty pleas.
Then, using a weighted average to calculate the overall wrongful
conviction rate—i.e., the 0.0066% wrongful conviction rate in guilty-plea cases and
the 0.50% wrongful conviction rate in trials—leads to a wrongful conviction rate of
.00031,192 or 0.031%, or 3.1 out of 10,000 violent crime convictions. Of course, this
wrongful conviction rate is not precise. To avoid any suggestion of false precision,
the wrongful conviction rate might be stated as a range, running from 50% below to
100% above the .031% rate—i.e., a wrongful conviction range of 0.016% to 0.062%.
A host of caveats need to be attached to this range. As should be clear from
the discussion above, precise data is lacking on many of the issues that are important
in deriving the range. Perhaps the two key components are the two discussed at
greatest length above: what percentage of violent crime cases occur under the
conditions that might permit wrongful convictions193 and what is the ratio of
wrongful convictions via guilty plea versus trial.194 These subjects need more
thorough investigation before we can have firm confidence in the range. But lack of
firm data has not prevented many other scholars from venturing an estimated
wrongful conviction rate range. The range presented here rests on at least as firm a
foundation as many others that have been presented.
While the implications of this range are discussed below,195 it is important
to recognize that this range is far below the violent crime error rates conventionally
discussed in the innocence literature. Taking, for example, Professor Gross’s 2017
estimate of a violent felony wrongful conviction rate of about “one to several
percent,”196 this range is about two orders of magnitude lower.197 Indeed, this range
is so low that, if correct, it could mean (in Professor Gross’s words) that wrongful

192.
(.0000657 x 95/5 + .0050)/(100 ÷ 5) = .00031. This is the same weightedaveraging formula used by Allen & Lauden, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 44, and not
critiqued by Risinger or others, so far as I can determine.
193.
See supra notes 73–121 and accompanying text.
194.
See supra notes 178–91 and accompanying text.
195.
See infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
196.
Gross, supra note 12, at 785.
197.
It is also significantly lower than Allen and Laudan’s error rate of 0.84%. See
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 71.
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convictions are “vanishingly rare” and “not . . . much of a problem”198—a point
discussed later.199

III.

THE MORAL CULPABILITY OF SOME OF THE WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED

In addition to the quantitative points about wrongful convictions, one
qualitative point deserves at least a brief mention. Typically, the cases highlighted
by innocence scholars involve cases of completely innocent people who had no
culpability whatsoever in producing their own wrongful convictions. But a high
percentage of wrongful conviction cases involve prisoners who have previously
committed many crimes.200 This point is suggested not only by the Yarris case
discussed above,201 but also by a North Carolina case I worked on as an expert
witness involving the alleged wrongful conviction of Robert Wilcoxson.202 The
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission found Wilcoxson to be innocent of
a drug-related murder.203 But it appears that one reason he fell under suspicion was
that, by his own admission, at the time of the murder he was an armed cocaine dealer
making tens of thousands of dollars from his crimes.204 Four other adults also fell
under suspicion and were also convicted, wrongfully they have apparently argued.205
Still, it appears that they may have all have been involved in a series of armed
robberies at around the same time.206 Thus, in this one case from North Carolina,
possibly involving multiple wrongful convictions, it appears that all five of the
allegedly wrongfully convicted participants may well have been involved in other
dangerous crimes apart from the murder for which they were convicted, which quite
naturally made it harder for them to convince authorities of their innocence.
The Wilcoxson case is not an outlier. The available empirical research
identifies a prior criminal record as a substantial contributing factor to wrongful
conviction. Professor Findley, for example, has noted that “while wrongful
conviction can happen to anyone, those with a prior record are at a significantly
higher risk of suffering such an injustice; the rate of exoneration is almost 50 percent

198.
Gross, supra note 1, at 176.
199.
See infra notes 224-48 and accompanying text.
200.
See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
201.
Recall that Yarris was wrongfully convicted for a rape-murder he did not
commit, but only after he tried to falsely implicate someone in the crime in an effort to be
released from prison. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
202.
I served as an expert witness on false confession issues for the law enforcement
officers Wilcoxson sued, alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights.
203.
State v Kagonyera, No. 00CRS56086, 2011 WL 8472667 (N.C. Super. Sep.
22, 2011).
204.
Deposition of Robert Wilcoxson, Wilcoxson v. Buncombe County et al., No.
1:13-cv-00224-MR-DLH (W.D.N.C. 2014) (on file with author).
205.
See Robert P. Mosteller, N.C. Inquiry Commission’s First Decade: Impressive
Successes and Lessons Learned, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1725, 1730 n.1 (2016) (discussing innocence
claims by Teddy Isbell, Damian Mills, and Larry Williams, Jr.).
206.
Testimony of Damian Mills to North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission,
at 481–82 (Dec. 18, 2013) (stating that he had been doing a series of breaking-and-entering
crimes with Kagonyera, Williams, Isbell, and Brewton).
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higher for those with a criminal record than for those without.”207 Findley’s
suspicions are supported by data from the National Registry of Exonerations. In a
recent preliminary tabulation (in 2017) when the Registry had collected 2,101
exonerations—and a total of 1,536 cases with reported data on prior records—of
those with prior-record data, 647 (42%) had a prior felony conviction, 163 (11%)
had a prior misdemeanor conviction, 30 (2%) had a prior juvenile felony conviction,
and 13 (1%) had a prior juvenile misdemeanor conviction.208 These numbers may
be slightly on the low side because it is possible that the data collected missed some
prior crimes known to police,209 and it may be easier for a person without a prior
conviction to obtain an exoneration (and thus a listing in the Registry) than one with
such a conviction. But the general picture of significant prior criminal activity by
the wrongfully convicted is clear. And more broadly, it is also true that in the modern
era, most defendants who stand trial have a criminal record that predates the charged
crime.210
A related point can be made about the wrongfully convicted who have pled
guilty. Unless the defendant has entered an Alford plea (pleading guilty but
preserving his position of innocence211), he has almost certainly committed perjury
before the Court in entering his plea. Again, this point can be made by looking at
the Wilcoxson case from North Carolina, just discussed.212 At their guilty-plea
207.
Keith A. Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1265, 1301 (2018); see also Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous
Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 492 (2014) (finding that prior criminal history influences
case outcome in wrongful conviction cases).
208.
Email from Samuel Gross, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. to
author (Sept. 30, 2017) (on file with author) (preliminary tabulation of data for National
Registry of Exonerations). These numbers are for the highest prior in each category—i.e., a
person with a felony conviction may also have misdemeanor convictions.
209.
See id. (noting this limitation but estimating that that the difference might be
in the range of an additional 1%–2%).
210.
Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 398 (2017) (citing
REAVES, supra note 191, at 8, 10–11 (reporting that 75% of suspects charged with a felony
had a prior arrest; 60% had a prior felony arrest; 60% had at least one prior conviction; and
43% had at least one prior felony conviction)); Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking
a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify
and Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1371 tbl.1 (2009) (study of felony trials in
four jurisdictions found 76% of the defendants standing trial had some kind of criminal
record); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 786-90, 786 tbl.1 (1979) (not reporting percentage but instead
providing statistic of an average of 2.7 prior convictions per defendant and that “most
defendants had prior convictions”); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 33 n.1 & 145 (2d ed. 1971) (in 47% of the trials in their sample from 1954
to 1955, the defendant had a prior record).
211.
See generally Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law
Values & Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford & Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1361 (2003); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1165–72
(2008); Sydney Schneider, Comment, When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing
the Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence
Movement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 279 (2013).
212.
See generally State v. Kagonyera/Wilcoxson, N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY
COMMISSION, http://innocencecommission-nc.gov/cases/state-v-kagonyera-wilcoxson/ (last
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hearings, both Wilcoxson and a codefendant, Kenneth Kagonyera, swore under oath
that they were guilty, that they were satisfied with defense counsel, and that the other
requisites for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea existed.213 So far as the court
records reveal, they also made no effort to enter an Alford plea. In addition, after
Kagonyera pled guilty, he met with the prosecutor and, in the presence of defense
counsel, made a very detailed statement about his involvement in the murder,
implicating five other people.214 Kagonyera made these statements at his own
initiative in an effort to convince the District Attorney that he could provide useful
information by testifying against his codefendants.215
To be clear, if Kagonyera and Wilcoxson were in fact innocent,216 their
guilty pleas were plainly wrongful convictions. And no doubt, their pleas resulted
from a plea bargaining process that can be coercive and place considerable pressure
on even innocent people to plead guilty—making the choice of an innocent person
to plead guilty in some sense rational.217 But particularly where defendants (like
Kagonyera and Wilcoxson) have made no effort to enter Alford pleas,218 a decision
to mislead the Court and enter a guilty plea produces a wrongful conviction that is,
at least to some extent, the result of illegal choices on their part and presumably
entitled to somewhat less weight in any social-harm calculus.219
The point here is not to blame those wrongfully convicted for their plight.
The more limited argument is that, when assessing the priority to be given to
competing claims between those wrongfully convicted and those who are past (or
prospective) crime victims, the victims may have far stronger claims. Some support
for this position comes from a study reporting that, for homicide and assault cases,
most of the victims had no prior arrest record, while most offenders did.220 This
suggests that simply weighing the risk of being a victim of a violent crime versus

visited Sep. 13, 2018).
213.
See State v. Kagonyera, Nos. 00 CRS 65086, 00 CRS 65088, 2011 WL
8472666 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2011).
214.
N.C. Innocence Comm’n Brief at 101, State v. Kagonyera, Nos. 00 CRS
65086, 00 CRS 65088 (N.C. Super. Ct.) (Memo. from Investigator Raymond to D.A. Moore
regarding statement made by Kenneth Kagonyera (Nov. 30, 2001)),
http://innocencecommission-nc.gov/wp-content/uploads/state-v-kagonyera-wilcoxson/statev-kagonyera-wilcoxson-brief.pdf .
215.
Transcript of Kagonyera Deposition at 134–35, State v. Kagonyera (Jan. 9,
2015) (Nos. 00 CRS 65086, 00 CRS 65088), http://innocencecommission-nc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/state-v-kagonyera-wilcoxson/transcript-of-kagonyera-deposition.pdf
(admitting this fact).
216.
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission found both men to be
factually innocent. See generally State v. Kagonyera / Wilcoxson, supra note 213.
217.
Compare Bowers, supra note 211, at 1165–72 (arguing that even Alford pleas
are invariably coercive), with Stephanos Bibas, Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 53, 54 (2008) (responding to Bowers’ article).
218.
Currently about 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system
allow Alford pleas. See Bibas, supra note 211, at 1372 n.52.
219.
It is also possible that they choose to plead guilty to the murder because they
were guilty of other serious, violent crimes. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
220.
See Varnedoe, supra note 108, at 8–9.
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the risk of being wrongfully convicted (as done in the next Section of this Article)
may not fully capture the competing weights on different sides of the scale.
To be sure, it is also possible to argue that a wrongful conviction may have
greater harmful consequences than does being the victim of a violent crime. While
the argument is difficult to make for the violent crime of murder, it is quite plausible
for the violent crime of aggravated assault. And, in theory at least, it should be
possible to try to quantify the size of competing concerns221—although significant
practical problems exist in trying to attach precise metrics. Criminal victimization
and wrongful conviction can both cause tremendous suffering.222 But tracing out
precise weights for competing sides of the scale is a project for a different article.
This Article simply notes that, when discussing cases of wrongful conviction, a
significant percentage of the defendants may bear some moral culpability for having
been wrongfully convicted.

IV.

PLACING THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION RATE IN CONTEXT

We now have an estimated concrete, empirically grounded wrongful
conviction rate range: 0.016%–0.062%.223 This range provides some tentative
measure of the wrongful conviction rate for violent crimes. And we also have some
sense that at least some of the wrongfully convicted will bear some degree of moral
culpability for their plight. All these points are, of course, subject to debate. But in
this concluding Part, it is worth considering the implications if these findings are
correct and, in particular, whether such a low frequency of wrongful convictions
would mean, in Professor Gross’s words, they are “not . . . much of a problem.”224
While the range is a low one, I reach a slightly different conclusion than
Gross. While the lower range suggests that innocence scholars have (perhaps
unsurprisingly) overstated the magnitude of the problem they are investigating,
innocence issues should remain a subject of concern. The lower range also suggests,
however, that innocence reform measures that increase the risk of guilty people
escaping conviction may be hard to justify through cost-benefit analysis. This
concern only increases the need to search for innocence reforms that avoid such
tradeoffs.
A. The “Low” Risk of Wrongful Conviction
How low is the estimated wrongful conviction rate range of 0.016%–
0.062%? It is useful to note initially that the range comfortably embraces the oftencriticized 0.027% figure cited by Justice Scalia in Kansas v. Marsh.225 Perhaps
221.
See Paul G. Cassell, Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful
Acquittals: Analyzing the Risks and Avoiding the Risks, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1435, 1445–
46 (2018); see also Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV.
1, 9 (2017) (discussing quantification of the costs of crime); BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF
JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES AND REMEDIES 45–56 (2004) (same).
222.
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 611, 629–30 (2009) (collecting examples of victim impact statements).
223.
See supra Section II.E.
224.
Gross, supra note 1, at 176.
225.
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23).
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because Scalia’s calculation was such an approximation,226 the innocence movement
did not feel the need to seriously consider its implications. Thus, Professor Gross
could casually assert that such a low overall error rate would mean that false
confessions were “vanishingly rare” and would demonstrate that “they would not be
much of a problem.”227 And others like Professor Dan Simon could quickly agree
that a wrongful conviction rate of 0.027% would be “indeed a small number,”228
while Professor Risinger could conclude that, if true, such a figure “would be cause
for rejoicing . . . .”229
But it is worth working through the implications of such a low error rate
more carefully than past commentators have done. One way to provide some context
is by considering how many people are wrongfully convicted for violent crimes if
this Article’s error-range figures are correct. Such an extrapolation is a standard
approach in the innocence literature.230 Taking the midpoint of the range (0.031%)
and applying it across the number of arrests for violent crimes (according to the FBI
Uniform Crime Reports) produces the result of about 160 people wrongfully
convicted each year in this country for a serious violent crime.231 This a conservative
calculation—i.e., it provides a generous figure—because the more accurate
multiplication would not be across arrests, but rather across the smaller number of
convictions.
Whether 160 is a number worth worrying about depends on your
perspective. Of course, for the 160 people involved—and their friends and
families—that is a large number. On the other hand, some might compare it to other
risks in our sprawling country to argue it is insignificant. I take this to be the point
of Professor Gross’s suggestion that a number of this size would not be much of a
problem. And someone intent on arguing that this is a small number could point out
that, by this estimate, about twice as many people are struck by lightning each year
as are wrongfully convicted for violent crimes.232
Another way to provide some context to the wrongful conviction error-rate
figure is to compare the risk of a wrongful conviction with other risks, particularly
risks connected to the way in which the criminal justice system operates. One
comparison that immediately comes to mind is the risk of being wrongfully
226.
Sam Gross has persuasively critiqued the methodology used by Marquis to
arrive at this calculation as relying upon a denominator that is too big. See Gross, supra note
5, at 69–70. The component-parts error rate avoids this particular problem.
227.
Gross, supra note 1, at 176.
228.
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
226 n.12 (2012).
229.
Risinger, supra note 53, at 762.
230.
See, e.g., Zalman, supra note 6, at 277–78.
231.
In 2016, there were 515,151 arrests for violent crimes. See Table 18: Estimated
Number of Arrests, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REP. 2016, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-18 (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
515,151 x 0.031% ≈ 160.
232.
See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., FACT SHEET: LIGHTNING
SAFETY
WHEN
WORKING
OUTDOORS
1
(2016),
https://www.weather.gov/media/owlie/OSHA_FS-3863_Lightning_Safety_05-2016.pdf
(300 people struck by lightning in the United States annually).
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convicted compared to the risk of becoming the victim of a violent crime. Using the
figures derived above, it is possible to provide a comparison of these two risks, as
has been done in the literature before.233 Previous research suggests that the
probability that someone will serve time in state or federal prison during his or her
lifetime is approximately 6.6%, and about one-third of these commitments—i.e.,
2.2%—are for violent crimes.234 Accordingly, it is possible to calculate a lifetime
risk that someone will be sent to prison as the result of a wrongful conviction for a
violent crime by multiplying the wrongful conviction risk by the sent-to-prison-forviolent-crime risk of 2.2%. Using the wrongful conviction figures above, the
lifetime risk is .00000682,235 or 0.00068%, or 0.68 out of every 100,000 people.
What about the risk of being the victim of a violent crime? Here, matters
are somewhat simpler to calculate. A 1987 U.S. Justice Department report based on
crime-victimization data offers a calculation of lifetime victimization risks.236 The
report concluded that the lifetime risk of being a victim of a violent crime was 83%
and of being a victim of a robbery or an assault resulting in injury was 40%.237
Unfortunately, that report has apparently not been updated. It was published in 1987
based on National Crime Survey data from 1975 to 1984. Since then, victimization
rates have fallen substantially by around 50%.238 Accordingly, in order to have a
current victimization figure comparable to the current wrongful conviction figure
calculated above, it is necessary to lower the lifetime figure to reflect this fact.
Adjusting for lower current crime rates, the current lifetime probability that a person
will be a victim of a violent crime is probably about 41.5% and that a person will be
a victim of a robbery or assault resulting in injury about 20%.239
233.
234.

See Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 80.
Id. at 80 n.81 (citing THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001 (2003)). Bonczar’s 2003
study does not break out the percentage of admissions to violent crimes, but his earlier study
based on 1991 data showed that 32.8% of the admissions were for violent offenses. THOMAS
P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO
STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 5 (1997), https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf. More recent
data appears to show that violent offenses constitute fewer than one-third of admissions to
prison. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS,
2006
–
STATISTICAL
TABLES
5
tbl.1.2.1
(2010),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. For simplicity and to be conservative, I
use Allen and Laudan’s one-third figure. Allen and Laudan also highlight rape cases, while I
have calculated figures for all violent crimes.
235.
.00031 x .022 = .00000682.
236.
HERBERT KOPPEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL REPORT: LIFETIME
LIKELIHOOD OF VICTIMIZATION 2 tbl.1 (1987), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/llv.pdf
(discussed in Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 80 n.81).
237.
Id.
238.
See generally BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN
AMERICA 221–64 (2016); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 3–
24 (2007).
239.
Making an exact adjustment for lower current crime rates is difficult, because
the lifetime victimization numbers rest on a nine-year (1975 to 1984) aggregation. Moreover,
it appears that recent adjustments have been made to the methodology for collecting
victimization data, which may make direct comparisons difficult. See, e.g., RACHEL MORGAN
& GRACE KENA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2016, at 2 (Dec. 2017),
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With these numbers in mind, it is possible to compare the relative risks of
these two events—i.e., compare the risk that a person will be the victim of a violent
crime versus the risk that they will be wrongfully convicted and sent to prison for a
violent crime. Indeed, in their earlier article, Professors Allen and Laudan attempted
such a comparison, concluding that “we can say with considerable confidence, that
the [lifetime] risk of being the victim of a serious crime in the United States is
significantly more than 300 times greater than the lifetime risk of being falsely
convicted of a serious crime.”240 However, their comparison simply began by
accepting Risinger’s 3.3% trial error rate—an error rate that, as discussed above, is
too high. Substituting the more realistic error rate calculated here, the approximate
risk ratios suggest that a person is about 30,000 times more likely to be the victim
of a violent crime than to be wrongfully convicted and sent to prison for a violent
crime and about 15,000 times more likely to be the victim of a robbery or assault
resulting in injury than to be wrongfully convicted and sent to prison for a violent
crime.241
B. Ensuring that Innocence Reforms Do Not Block Prosecution of the Guilty
From comparisons such as these, it is possible to conclude that wrongful
convictions are “vanishingly rare” and “not . . . much of a problem.” I draw a slightly
different and more nuanced conclusion. An error rate of 0.031% does show a
remarkably high degree of accuracy in America’s criminal justice system. But the
goal of the system, of course, should always be 100.000% accuracy. If there are
steps that can reasonably be taken to drive down what is already a very low error
rate even further, those steps should be taken.
Where this quantification becomes important, however, is in considering
possible tradeoffs that inhere in certain innocence reforms. Sadly, wrongful
convictions are not the only kinds of tragedies that the criminal justice system must
be concerned about.242 As Josh Marquis has cogently observed, “The justice system
is far from perfect and has made many mistakes, mostly in favor of the accused.
Hundreds, if not thousands, have died or lost their livelihoods through
embezzlement or rape because the American justice system failed to incarcerate
people who were guilty by any definition.”243
Certain reforms to the system pose no risks of tradeoffs at all. For example,
DNA technology made it possible to more precisely identify markers left at crime
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16.pdf. As best I can determine, the most recent
(2016) violent crime victimization rate is 24.2 per 1,000 population, see id., which is at least
50% of the rate reported during the 1975–1984 period. Accordingly, to come up with a
conservative calculation, I simply cut the 1987 BJS lifetime victimization numbers in half—
i.e., multiplied by .5—to have them roughly reflect current crime victimization rates.
240.
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 49, at 79–80.
241.
Taking 41.5% and 20.0% and dividing by .0011%, produces ratios of more
than 37,000:1 and 18,000:1 respectively. It is possible that these ratios are slightly overstated,
because it is not clear that the definition of “violent crime” corresponds precisely in the two
lifetime-risk ratios. To guard against this possibility, I have reduced the risk ratio slightly to
the numbers shown in the text.
242.
See Alec Whalen, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive
Account, 76 LA. L. REV. 356, 357–60 (2015).
243.
Marquis, supra note 17, at 517–18 (emphasis added).
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scenes, thus not only helping to convict the guilty but to exclude the innocent from
erroneously falling under suspicion. And in other articles, I have tried to expand this
point, identifying other reforms in the criminal justice system that could provide
greater protection against wrongful convictions while posing no obstacle to
conviction of the guilty.244 For example, we could expand research aimed at
quantifying the magnitude and scope of the wrongful conviction problem and how
we might respond to it.245 “Win-win” approaches of this type should be readily
embraced.
But in structuring our criminal justice system, all too often hard choices
have to be made between providing protections against wrongful convictions and
protections for society by allowing the criminal justice system to move forward even
at the risk of an occasional error.246 For example, more rigid requirements for a valid
eyewitness identification may protect some innocent people from being mistakenly
identified, but at the cost of preventing some guilty people from being properly
identified.247 In assessing the tradeoffs involved in such reforms, the size of relative
risks does matter. And it is in such assessments that the quantification attempted in
this Article will be important. If we are weighing competing risks, it would be one
thing to know that the current criminal justice system is wrongfully convicting 3%
of all people who are charged—and quite another to know that the system makes
such errors in 0.031% of all cases. Where the cost-benefit calculation tips will
depend on the particulars of each situation. But it is important to have some realistic
assessment of how well the system is functioning.

CONCLUSION
This Article attempts a preliminary answer to the most basic and important
question about wrongful convictions: how often do they occur? While previous
scholars have suggested that the general wrongful conviction rate is at least 1%—or

244.
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent without Freeing the
Guilty? Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Trade-offs, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 264; see also Carissa Byrne
Hessick, DNA Exonerations and the Elusive Promise of Criminal Justice Reform, 15 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 271, 277 (2017).
245.
Cassell, supra note 244, at 271–72.
246.
See Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some
Skeptical Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
1063,1078-80 (2011); cf. Henrik Lando & Murat C. Mungan, The Effect of Type-1 Error on
Deterrence, 53 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2018) (arguing that wrongful convictions do not
generally lead to the tradeoff of lower deterrence). See generally Matthew Tokson, Blank
Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 608 (2018) (discussing approaches to normative balancing).
247.
See generally Steven E. Clark, Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness
Identification Evidence, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 1105 (2010) (discussing tradeoffs); Laurie N.
Feldman, The Unreliable Cases Against the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications: A
Response to Judge Alex Kozinski, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493 (2016) (same); see also Athan
P. Papailious, David V. Yokum & Christopher T. Robertson, The Novel New Jersey
Eyewitness Instruction Induces Skepticism But Not Sensitivity, PLOS-ONE, Dec. 9, 2015,
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0142695 (finding that
recently adopted New Jersey cautionary instruction caused mock jurors to indiscriminantly
discount “weak” and “strong” testimony in equal measure).
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4% or even more—this Article reaches a quite different conclusion. Based on current
data, it is possible to construct a plausible error rate for violent crimes somewhere
in the range of 0.016%–0.062%.
In deriving this estimate, I have tried to “show my work”—i.e., to lay out
all the assumptions that are required and the specific empirical foundation that
underlies each of them. Of course, it would be desirable to have more data about the
many subjects discussed here. This Article has highlighted many areas where
research is lacking and has called for efforts to more accurately map the landscape.
Perhaps my reassessment and reduction of earlier estimates will spur further
research on this important subject.
This Article does not claim to be the last word on the subject of America’s
wrongful conviction rate. Without a doubt, improvements can and will be made to
the estimates advanced here. But the important, big-picture point from this estimate
is that the innocence literature has apparently been assuming wrongful conviction
rates that seem to be well above the real-world mark. America’s criminal justice
system is imperfect. But at least on this measure, it is not nearly so bad as many
others have suggested.
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APPENDIX – ANALYSIS OF RISINGER’S WRONGFUL CONVICTION
CASES IN LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS
This Appendix analyzes the 11 cases of wrongful conviction that form the
basis for Professor Michael Risinger’s 3.3% wrongful conviction rate.248 The 11
cases were tried between 1982 and 1989.249 The limited point of this Appendix is
that, in each of the 11 cases, due to improvements in DNA testing and forensic
sciences, as well as other new legal safeguards against wrongful conviction, none of
these wrongfully convicted people250 would be convicted if the trial had been held
today.
The 11 cases are discussed in chronological order of the date of trial.
A. Nicholas Yarris (1982)
In 1982, Nicholas Yarris was convicted and sentenced to death for
abduction, rape, and murder in Pennsylvania.251 Yarris was pulled over, driving a
stolen car,252 four days after the victim’s body was found.253 He then attacked the
police officer and was arrested for attempted murder.254 While in custody, Yarris
confessed that he and a friend abducted the victim and that Yarris raped her and his
friend stabbed her to death.255 This, combined with the facts that Yarris visited the
victim’s place of employment after she was killed,256 a jailhouse informant claimed
Yarris confessed to him, and Yarris’s bodily fluids seemingly matched that of the
perpetrator,257 led to his conviction and death sentence in 1982.258
In 1984, Yarris escaped custody.259 He was caught and convicted for the
escape and stealing the car which set off the events of his initial arrest but was
acquitted of attempted murder of the police officer who pulled him over.260
As discussed above,261 conventional serological testing was performed on
the rape kit, the results of which could not exclude Yarris. In 2003, Yarris was
248.
See Risinger, supra note 53, at 780.
249.
See id. at 770–71, 770 n.14.
250.
For simplicity, I assume all 11 cases involve factually innocent people who
were wrongfully convicted.
251.
Nicholas Yarris, supra note 90.
252.
Death Penalty: Nicholas Yarris Spent 22 Years on Death Row for a Murder
He
Didn’t
Commit,
TIMES
HERALD
(Sept.
12,
2015,
8:36
PM),
https://www.timesherald.com/news/death-penalty-nicholas-yarris-spent-years-on-deathrow-for/article_9967bc39-4c07-51b8-b377-b39c38e50eee.html.
253.
Nicholas Yarris, supra note 90.
254.
Id.
255.
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 549 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa. 1988).
256.
Yarris said to one of the victim’s coworkers, “I heard that she was raped.” At
that time, the rape was not public knowledge. Id. at 584.
257.
The perpetrator had type AB or B secretions, which constituted 13% of the
male population, and Yarris was type B. Id. at 583.
258.
Nicholas Yarris, supra note 90.
259.
Death Penalty: Nicholas Yarris Spent 22 Years on Death Row for a Murder
He Didn’t Commit, supra note 252.
260.
Id. Yarris claims the charges of attempted murder were “trumped up.”
261.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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exonerated after DNA evidence definitively ruled him out as the perpetrator of the
crime.262
B. Charles Fain (1983)
Charles Irvin Fain was convicted of the kidnapping, sexual assault, and
murder of a nine-year-old girl in Idaho.263 He was arrested nearly one year after the
murder when an eyewitness described a car similar to Fain’s “uniquely painted
automobile” in the vicinity of the abduction and the abductor as having similar
features to Fain.264 Pubic hairs found on the victim’s body were similar to Fain’s,
and jailhouse informants claimed Fain confessed to the crime.265 Further, Fain
allegedly asked a friend, “What would you say if I told you I killed someone?” and
a shoeprint near the body could have been made by one of Fain’s shoes.266 However,
Fain passed a polygraph test, which indicated he was not the perpetrator; he claimed
he was asleep at his father’s house in Oregon, 360 miles away.267
As discussed earlier, the hair-fiber evidence would presumably be treated
more favorably to Fain today in light of recent advances in forensic science in the
area.268 More significantly, in 2001 mitochondrial-DNA testing definitively ruled
him out as the perpetrator.269 As Fain’s attorney explained after the DNA tests, “The
hair was really the linchpin of [the prosecution’s] case, and the other evidence is
highly suspect. It is not just that the state has the same case minus the hair evidence;
the pubic hair evidence is now our evidence. It is exonerating evidence.”270
C. Earl Washington (1984)
Earl Washington, Jr. was convicted and sentenced to death for rape and
murder in 1984 in Virginia.271 Washington, who had an IQ of 69,272 came under
suspicion after he was arrested, nearly one year after the murder, for “breaking into
262.
Nicholas Yarris, supra note 90; see also Cacciottolo, supra note 140 (noting
“there were DNA traces of two unknown men in the car and on [the victim’s] clothing”).
263.
Charles
Fain,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3209
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2018).
264.
State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 225 (Idaho 1989).
265.
Charles Fain, supra note 263. One of the informants later recanted his
testimony and claimed that prosecutors threatened him to get him to testify. Henry Weinstein,
Condemned Man Could Go Free After DNA Testing, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2001),
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/19/news/mn-35886.
266.
Fain, 774 P.2d at 255.
267.
Raymond Bonner, Death Row Inmate Is Freed After DNA Test Clears Him,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/24/us/death-row-inmate-isfreed-after-dna-test-clears-him.html.
268.
See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
269.
Bonner, supra note 267. The trial judge told the New York Times, “If I had
the slightest doubt, I certainly would not have imposed the death penalty.” Id.
270.
Weinstein, supra note 265.
271.
Earl
Washington,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/earl-washington/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2018). See
generally MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL
WASHINGTON, JR. (2003).
272.
Earl Washington, supra note 271
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the apartment of an elderly neighbor and beating her with a chair. He also stole a
gun from the victim, which he subsequently used to shoot his brother in a dispute
over a woman.”273
When in custody, Washington confessed to five crimes, “the first four were
dismissed by the Commonwealth because of the inconsistencies of the testimony
and the inability of the victims to identify Washington.”274 His answers to questions
regarding the rape and murder were drastically different from the facts of the case.
Evidence found at the crime scene included “a rare plasma protein,” which
Washington did not possess.275 After he became a suspect, “an amended forensic
report was prepared (without additional testing being conducted) that said testing
for the rare protein was ‘inconclusive.’”276 In 1993, “DNA test results revealed that
Washington was excluded as a contributor of the seminal stain,” but he was unable
to introduce new evidence under Virginia law, and instead his death sentence was
commuted to life in prison.277 In 2000, the DNA test prompted the governor of
Virginia to release Washington from prison and give him a limited pardon in
2001.278 Six years later, in 2007, Washington was given an absolute pardon after
another inmate already serving life in prison for rape pled guilty to the rape and
murder.279
D. Kirk Bloodsworth (1985)
Kirk Bloodsworth was sentenced to death in 1985 for the rape and murder
of a nine-year-old girl in Maryland.280 Evidence used at trial included five witnesses
who testified that he was with the victim or near the scene of the crime when it was
committed and shoe marks on the victim’s body that were linked to a pair of
Bloodsworth’s shoes.281
In 1993, Bloodsworth became “the first U.S. death row prisoner to be
cleared by DNA” and was given “a full pardon based on innocence” the following
year.282 In 2003, newly found stains on a sheet from the crime were tested for DNA.
The DNA matched that of Kimberly Shay Ruffner, who had been in the same prison

273.
Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
274.
Earl Washington, supra note 271.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
280.
See TIM JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE FIRST DEATH ROW
INMATE EXONERATED BY DNA EVIDENCE 4 (2005); BARRY SCHECK ET. AL, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 275–88 (2003).
281.
Kirk
Bloodsworth,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3032
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2018). Two of the witnesses could not identify Bloodsworth in a lineup “but
had seen him . . . on television.” Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kirk-bloodsworth/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
282.
Kirk Bloodsworth, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, supra note 281.
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with Bloodsworth; Bloodsworth, as the prison librarian, “had regularly delivered
books to Ruffner and the two had lifted weights together.”283
E. Rolando Cruz (1985)
Rolando Cruz was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1983
kidnapping, rape, and murder of a ten-year-old girl in Illinois.284 Cruz was “a 20year-old gang member who gave the police a fabricated story in the hope of
collecting [a $10,000] reward.”285 Instead, it caused Cruz and two of his associates,
Alejandro Hernandez (discussed below) and Stephen Buckley, to come under
suspicion, and all three were charged with the kidnapping, murder, and rape—
among other crimes.286
Despite Cruz’s dubious actions, John Sam, the lead detective on the case,
“resigned in protest, because he believed the three men were innocent.”287 Cruz and
Hernandez were convicted and sentenced to death.288 After the trial, “a serial killer
named Brian Dugan confessed that he alone had committed the crime,” and the
convictions were reversed in 1989.289 Cruz and Hernandez were retried, and Cruz
was once again convicted and sentenced to death.290 Eventually, DNA evidence
conclusively excluded both Hernandez and Cruz and established that Brian Dugan
had in fact committed the rape and murder.291
F. Alejandro Hernandez (1985)
As just discussed in connection with Rolando Cruz, Alejandro Hernandez
fell under suspicion for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 10-year-old girl when
his associate, Rolando Cruz, lied about having information on the case in order to
get the $10,000 reward offered.292 Both Hernandez and Cruz were convicted of the
crime. Eventually, DNA conclusively ruled out both men and established that the
serial killer who had confessed years earlier had indeed committed the crimes.293
G. Verneal Jimerson (1985)
Verneal Jimerson, along with three other men—collectively known as the
“Ford Heights Four”294—was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a
283.
Id.
284.
Rolando Cruz, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/il/rolandocruz.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2018); see also TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS (Rob
Warden & Steven Drizin eds., 2009). See generally SCHECK ET AL., supra note 280.
285.
Rolando Cruz, supra note 284.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
288.
Id.
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
291.
Id. (“[A]dvanced DNA testing positively excluded Cruz as the source of
biological material recovered from the victim and positively linked Dugan to the crime.”).
292.
Alejandro
Hernandez,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3292
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2018).
293.
Id.
294.
Jimerson and another of his friends, Denis Williams, were sentenced to death.
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man and the rape and murder of a woman in Chicago.295 Eyewitness testimony
(which was recanted but later readopted after the witness was convicted as an
accomplice to the crime and for perjury) and imprecise serological testimony led to
Jimerson’s conviction.296 In particular, “State forensic serologist Michael Podlecki
testified that Jimerson had Type O blood and was a ‘secretor.’ The serologist
concluded that Jimerson was a possible source of bodily fluid found on a vaginal
smear recovered from [one of the victim’s] body.”297
Years later, journalism students at Northwestern University began
investigating the case and found a tip that police never followed up on.298 The tip
implicated “three other suspects who would later be recognized as the real
perpetrators.”299 The students sought newly developed DNA evidence, which
excluded all of the Ford Heights Four.300 The new DNA testing also “inculpated
Arthur (Red) Robinson, who confessed to the crime, inculpating three other
persons,” who were, indeed, the subjects of the then-ignored tip.301
H. Frankie Lee Smith (1986)
Frankie Lee Smith was convicted and sentenced to death for the brutal rape
and murder of an eight-year-old girl incident to a home burglary in Florida in
1986.302 Based on “shaky eyewitness descriptions from neighbors” and his criminal
history, Smith was identified by the victim’s mother, who had seen a man “leaving
her home through the living room window on the night of the murder.”303 Smith died
of cancer on death row in 2000.304
Eleven months later, new DNA testing exonerated Smith and implicated
Eddie Lee Mosley, who was a convicted rapist and murderer.305

Another friend, Kenneth Adams, was given 75 years in prison, and Willie Rainge was
sentenced
to
life
in
prison.
Verneal
Jimerson,
INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/verneal-jimerson/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2018).
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
297.
Verneal Jimerson Case Summary, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/documents/i
lJimersonChart.pdf (last visited Sep. 13, 2018).
298.
Verneal Jimerson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 294.
299.
Id.
300.
Id.
301.
See Verneal Jimerson Case Summary, supra note 297; Verneal Jimerson,
supra note 294. One of the actual perpetrators was already dead, “but the others were
convicted of the double murder and acknowledged their involvement in the crime.” Verneal
Jimerson Case Summary, supra note 297.
302.
Frankie
Lee
Smith,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/frank-lee-smith/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2018).
303.
Id. The eyewitness testimony was later recanted. See Requiem for Frank Lee
Smith: Eight Things to Know About This Case, PBS: FRONTLINE,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/smith/eight/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2018).
304.
Frankie Lee Smith, supra note 302.
305.
Id.; see also Jackie Hallifax, DNA Evidence Clears Inmate After His Death,
ABCNEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94701&page=1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2018)

862
I.

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:815

Ron Williamson (1988)

Ronald Keith Williamson and an acquaintance were convicted and
sentenced to death in 1988 for the sexual assault and murder of a 21-year-old
waitress in 1982.306 Both men frequented the establishment where the victim
worked, and the victim “had previously complained to a friend that [the men] made
her nervous.”307 While Williamson was in jail, an inmate told police she heard him
talking about the killing.308 This testimony, other jailhouse-informant testimony, and
an alleged confession by Williamson (in which he recounted a dream he had about
killing the victim) were used against him at trial.309 Furthermore, forensic
investigators found similarities between hairs recovered from the victim and
Williamson, and the semen recovered “suggested that the perpetrator(s) were nonsecretors, as [Williamson’s acquaintance] and Williamson are.”310
In 1999, both men were exonerated after DNA testing excluded them from
the semen left in the victim and “testing proved that none of the many hairs that
were labeled ‘matches’ belonged to them.”311 Additionally, the DNA test implicated
Glenn Gore, who was the State’s main witness at trial.312 Not only was Williamson
excluded through semen analysis, but an important part of the prosecution’s case
was forensic testimony that his hair matched those that were found on the victim.
Improvements in forensic science that would favor Williamson in this area were
discussed earlier in this Article.313
J.

Robert Miller (1988)

Robert Lee Miller, Jr. was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape
and murder of two elderly women in Oklahoma City in 1988.314 Semen, blood, hair,
and saliva samples were taken from the crime scenes, which led investigators to
believe “the perpetrator was a secretor with type A blood” and that the perpetrator
was more likely than not African American.315 Miller was “known to police,” which
resulted in his providing a blood sample and being interrogated.316 Miller’s test
(reporting prosecutor’s conversation with the FBI, in which they stated that Smith “has been
excluded, he didn’t do it”).
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showed he was a type-A secretor and, along with the odd responses he gave during
his 12-hour interrogation—presumably the result of being “under the influence of
marijuana cigarettes dipped in PCP”—was charged and eventually convicted of the
crimes.317
Miller was granted a new trial, acquitted, and released in 1998 after DNA
testing revealed “he could not have been the source” of the semen found at the crime
scenes.318 Furthermore, more refined analysis showed that the hair comparisons used
at trial were “essentially meaningless” and “completely unjustified.”319 The DNA
testing also identified the real perpetrator, Ronald Lott, who was “an initial alternate
suspect” and “had confessed to two similar crimes . . . while Miller was
incarcerated.”320
K. Ronald Jones (1989)
Ronald Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder
of a 28-year-old woman in Chicago in 1989.321 Jones, an alcoholic, lived in the
neighborhood where the crime occurred.322 Approximately two months after the
murder, Jones was identified by a rape victim as her assailant.323 Although he was
released on insufficient evidence of the rape, the prosecutor thought he was guilty
of both crimes due to the similarities between the rape and the earlier rape-murder.324
Jones was arrested later for the rape-murder and confessed to the crime, which
detectives claimed was voluntary, but Jones claimed was beaten out of him.325
Illinois now requires the videotaping of all custodial police interrogations,326 which
might have helped Jones demonstrate that this “confession” was a false one.
More importantly, semen was recovered from the scene of the crime, but
“the state claimed [it] was too small a quantity to test.”327 Years later, after
technology improved, the semen was tested, and it conclusively ruled out Jones as
the source of the semen.328
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